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Abstract
This research project primarily aims to develop two pieces of knowledge:
• Identify whether Rio Tinto Iron Ore’s (RTIO) current locomotive diesel engine
maintenance regime is optimised.
• Identify the failure modes and the risk mitigated by each maintenance task that
is performed.
The current maintenance program has been directly transferred from the Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) recommendations. As such, RTIO has not developed
an understanding of:
• How each maintenance task impacts the reliability of the locomotive fleet
• How much risk each maintenance task mitigates, and whether the task is worth-
while
• Failure modes that are occurring but are not formally addressed in the mainte-
nance management system
Without this knowledge, RTIO cannot be assured that the maintenance resources al-
located to engine maintenance are utilised efficiently.
The literature reviewed did not find research that had analysed the maintenance regime
applied to locomotive engines operating in a hot, semi-arid mining environment, reveal-
ing an opportunity for this research project to contribute to the body of knowledge on
diesel engine maintenance.
ii
The project applied the Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) methodology to de-
velop engine maintenance tactic recommendations. The data necessary for the analysis
was obtained from a variety of sources, including:
• Senior tradespeople, technicians and engineers
• Computerised maintenance records
• Production delay and failure records
• Component failure analysis reports
• Textbooks and academic research papers on engine failure analysis
• OEM training manuals
The RCM methodology inherently produces a database that details the failure modes
and the risk mitigated by each maintenance task, providing a platform that can be
continually built on over time. As a result of this database, RTIO now possesses the
knowledge necessary to evaluate the failure modes and the risk that is mitigated by each
maintenance task, providing the foundation to make informed maintenance decisions
as the operating context changes over time.
Finally, the maintenance task recommendations generated by the analysis were com-
pared to the current maintenance tactics in order to establish the optimisation of the
current regime. The research project has concluded that the maintenance regime is
generally optimised, but a number of minor improvements are identified.
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Nomenclature xxi
Nomenclature
Age exploration The process of determining the aging characteristics
and potential failure modes of equipment if no service
life data is available.
Applicable maintenance task A task that addresses the identified failure mode. This
term has the same meaning as ‘technically feasible’.
Default actions Actions that are employed only when no proactive
tasks are technically feasible and worth doing.
Effective maintenance task A task that reduces risk to acceptable level and/or
mitigates the failure consequences. This term has the
same meaning as ‘worth doing’.
Evident function A function whose failure will be naturally detected by
the operating crew.
Failure consequences The results and outcomes of a failure, including the
type of consequence (environmental, safety, economic)
and the severity of the results.
Failure mode A description of a single event or physical condition
that prevents the asset from performing its function.
Fail-safe An item that has a protective function is fail-safe if,
when it fails, it becomes ‘evident’ to the operating
crew.
Nomenclature xxii
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.
Function What the user wants an asset to do.
Functional Failure The inability of an asset to perform a given function.
GEVO The General Electric (GE) term for the GE-Evolution
engine.
Hidden function A function whose functional failure will not become
evident to the operating crew until a ‘multiple failure
occurs’s, e.g. a seized safety valve.
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
Multiple Failure A failure of a protective function and its respective
protected function.
Proactive tasks Maintenance tasks chosen to proactively prevent fail-
ures or mitigate the failure consequences.
RCM Reliability-Centered Maintenance.
P-F interval, curve The P-F curve illustrates the concept of failures ex-
hibiting early warning signs. A detectable potential
failure condition is designated ‘P’, the failure condi-
tion is designated ‘F’, and the time period between
the two is the P-F interval. Refer to figure 2.8.
PM Preventive Maintenance.
Run-to-failure A maintenance strategy that involves no maintenance;
the failure is simply accepted.
Nomenclature xxiii
Safe life The life before which no failures have occurred.
Scheduled Discard A proactive maintenance task that replaces an item
after a set service life.
Scheduled Restoration A proactive maintenance task that overhauls an item
after a set service life.
Technically Feasible A task that addresses the identified failure mode.
Worth Doing A task that reduces risk to acceptable level and/or
mitigates the failure consequences.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Chapter Overview
Maintenance of an asset is critical to ongoing performance and production. No matter
how well suited an asset is to the operation, production targets will never be met if the
asset is not maintained to continue performing its function. Conversely, if an asset is
over-maintained, faults can be introduced to the system and excess resources consumed
with no benefit in functional reliability gained.
This dissertation aims to apply a proven, systematic methodology for developing opti-
mised maintenance tactics for the Rio Tinto Iron Ore Evolution locomotive engine.
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives
Currently, RTIO accepts the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) maintenance
tactics without a thorough and documented understanding of the value generated by
each maintenance task, reducing RTIOs ability to make informed maintenance deci-
sions as the operating context changes. The literature reviewed in section 2.2 reveals
an absence of academic literature covering the analysis of locomotive diesel engine
maintenance tactics in the operating context of a hot, semi-arid mining environment,
indicating that the project can contribute new knowledge in this area.
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The knowledge that this project aims to establish is whether RTIO’s current Evolution
locomotive engine maintenance is optimised for the present operating context as well
as the failure modes and risk mitigated by each maintenance task. Underpinning the
development of this knowledge are the following research objectives:
1. If the maintenance is not optimised, evaluate and identify areas of excess mainte-
nance, inadequate maintenance and recurring failure modes that are not appro-
priately addressed by a maintenance task.
2. Research and document failure modes, failure effects and failure consequences to
ensure the analysis is thorough and complete. Based on this data, determine tasks
that are ‘technically feasible’ and ‘worth doing’ in order to address any identi-
fied maintenance shortcomings. Identify and document maintenance tasks that
may be undertaken informally or not documented in current work management
practices.
3. Evaluate the applicability of alternative maintenance and condition monitoring
tasks to the asset to improve productivity.
4. Develop knowledge of component failure mode service life characteristics (using
the Weibull distribution).
5. Assess engine subsystem performance in terms of maintenance spend, corrective
maintenance requirements, production delays and health, safety and environmen-
tal risk.
6. Define the operating context of the locomotive engine.
1.3 Project Context and Justification
RTIO’s Pilbara railroad operation is unique when compared to General Electric Trans-
portation Systems’ (GETS) largest customers, the North American Class 1 railroads.
This has led to the concern that the standard maintenance tactics recommended by
GETS (and currently employed by RTIO) are not optimised for RTIO.
Section 2.4.4 discusses the applicability of the RCM methodology. This project satisfies
the criteria, as the locomotive engine is a complex machine subject to an unrefined
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maintenance regime recommended by the OEM (GETS) and is operating in a unique
and complex environment.
The following discussion points support the claim that RTIO’s Pilbara railroad opera-
tion is unique when compared to the majority of North American railroads.
• Production supply chain pressure. J McArthur (2014, pers. comm., 6 March)
advises that the RTIO railroad is part of an optimised supply chain and delays in
the rail network directly cause lost production, which is critical in a continuous
operation. By contrast, general freight railroads (such as the North American
Class 1 railroads) have a variety of independent customers with differing business
objectives so delays due to equipment failure do not carry the same consequences.
C Wakeling (2014, pers. comm., 7 March) supports this view. The RTIO network
measures derailment cost in the order of $M/hr. Accordingly, delay reduction is
the primary focus while general freight railroads have slimmer margins and cost
reduction is the primary focus.
• Maintenance depot location. North American railroads utilise maintenance de-
pots at strategic locations on the track network. RTIO only has maintenance
depots located on the coast, near the port. This increases the criticality of lo-
comotive failure due to reduced opportunity of mainline locomotive replacement
(McArthur, J 2014, pers. comm. 6 March).
C Wakeling (2014, pers. comm., 7 March) provides a different perspective, believ-
ing that it is easier to maintain assets on the RTIO network. RTIO assets always
need to travel past a maintenance depot on their journey, while other railroads
may not see a particular rolling stock asset travel via a maintenance depot for
long periods of time if the asset is ‘locked’ in traffic travelling a certain part of
the network. The asset may be hundreds of kilometres from the nearest depot.
• Climate. RTIO Evolution locomotives feature an oversized radiator to cope with
the extreme temperatures encountered. The locomotives are operating on the
edge of design limits for heat, but are not concerned with extreme cold and wet
weather seen in North American fleets (Wakeling, C 2014, pers. comm., 7 March).
• Track profile. C Wakeling (2014, pers. comm., 7 March) and J McArthur (2014,
pers. comm., 6 March) agree that most other railway track profiles are gently
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undulating with short, steep inclines, requiring maximum locomotive power for
short periods of time. The RTIO network has long, gradual inclines that require
maximum power. The long periods of heavy loading naturally induces higher
levels of wear and tear on the power plant. J McArthur (2014, pers. comm., 6
March) notes that the locomotive is likely to spend in the order of 20% more time
producing full power, and the duration of each full power event is much longer.
Locomotives are also rotated through positions as ‘banker’ locomotives with the
sole purpose of pushing fully-laden ore trains up steep grades out of the mines.
While in this position, the locomotive spends all of its time producing full power.
1.4 Project Scope
The project scope includes a Reliability-Centered Maintenance analysis of the compo-
nents physically attached to the mainframe and associated engine systems located in
the engine cab that perform a function fundamental to the generation of mechanical
power. The timeframe of the project has permitted analysis of the fuel system, com-
bustion air system and the power assemblies (further detail on the system components
and boundaries is included in section 3.4 and appendix C).
The implementation of the maintenance recommendations is excluded from the project
scope, although it is an essential step to be carried out following the project completion.
1.5 System Overview
The engine system is defined as the assembly of eight engine subsystems. The subsys-
tems are detailed in section 3.4 while an overview is provided below:
• Bottom end
• Fuel system
• Engine sensors
• Long power assembly
• Lubricating oil system
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• Cooling system
• Combustion air system
• Exhaust air system
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1.6 Chapter Summary
Chapter one has documented the fundamental research aims, context and scope.
The following chapters lay the foundation for the development of the research goals
and the methodology to be employed throughout the analysis.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Chapter Overview
This literature review aims to:
• Identify literature that will inform the project of the research need and the knowl-
edge that this research project can contribute to the academic body of knowledge.
• Assess and establish the suitability of RCM to this project.
• Identify the methodology and requirements for an RCM analysis.
• Review examples of RCM applied to diesel engines in locomotive applications or
hot climates in order to identify any existing knowledge gaps.
• Identify diesel engine condition monitoring tools that could be applied to RTIO’s
GEVO locomotive engine.
• Assess the suitability of reliability modelling for engine failures, and identify ap-
plicable methodology.
• Build a foundational knowledge of common engine component failure modes.
• Identify legislation and regulatory requirements pertaining to locomotive engine
maintenance.
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2.2 Previous heavy diesel engine maintenance research
studies
The author has found a large amount of research literature produced on the topic of
diesel engine maintenance condition monitoring development (including Lowe (2013),
Gu & Yang (2007) and Elamin, Gu & Ball (2010)) and diesel engine design (such as
Mollenhauer & Tschke (2010), Liu, Huang, Miao & Zuo (2007) and Arcidiacono & Cam-
patelli (2004)), but very little literature discussing the optimisation of the maintenance
regime applied to an active asset.
The literature relating to diesel engine maintenance includes the following:
• Milkie & Perakis (2004) discuss the optimisation of diesel engine maintenance
overhauls using Weibull modelling of engine failure events (not specific failure
modes); however, this is focussing on only the overhaul aspect of engine mainte-
nance, not the ongoing maintenance and purpose for each maintenance task.
• Youngk (2000) investigates the effect of oil drain intervals on engine reliability;
again, this is only one aspect of engine maintenance.
• Procaccia, Lannoy & Clarotti (1997) applies statistical theory to determine the
optimum lifespan of diesel engine cylinder liners.
The articles referenced above are in the same field as this research project, but only
focus on one specific part of the engine maintenance regime. It would appear that while
work very similar to this project must have been completed previously for maintenance
regimes to exist, it has not been documented in any body of academic literature.
Even if similar work from a different diesel engine application had been found in the
literature review, Moubray (2001, pg. 28,79) identifies that the operating context of an
asset forms the foundation for the maintenance tactic development and that identical
assets in different operations will require unique maintenance tactics. Fundamentally,
this concept drives the project research aims, in that the RTIO Pilbara operation is
unique (as established in section 1.3), requiring unique maintenance tactics. Research
on the maintenance tactics applied to the Evolution locomotive operating in hot, semi-
arid mining operations has not been conducted or documented, creating an opportunity
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for this project to contribute new knowledge to the body of academic literature.
2.3 Suitability of the Reliability-Centered Maintenance
Methodology
Rausand (1998) writes that after development in the aviation industry, RCM was
adapted to a variety of high risk industries including nuclear energy, offshore oil and
gas, and military forces. Additionally, the article notes that the RCM concept has been
described in several reports, textbooks and standards, both civilian and military. The
article presents RCM as a philosophy for maintenance tactic analysis and development
of any equipment, and this is supported by Moubray (2001, pg. 1), Netherton (2002),
Gabbar, Yamashita, Suzuki & Shimada (2003) and Standards Australia (2011).
Technical groups (SAE, American Society of Materials (ASM), International Elec-
trotechnical Commission (IEC)) and Standards organisations (Australian Standards)
have published descriptions and standards for RCM (Netherton 2002) (Standards Australia
2011), supporting the idea that RCM has gained a reputation as an effective and robust
methodology across a wide variety of industries. Netherton (2002) further supports this
idea and states that RCM is used around the world in almost every industry, and is a
“formidably powerful tool”.
Specific examples of academic research papers detailing industry application of RCM
include:
• Large scale railway networks (Carretero, Prez, Garca-Carballeira, Caldern, Fern-
ndez, Garca, Lozano, Cardona, Cotaina & Prete 2003)
• Power distribution networks (Bertling, Allan & Eriksson 2005)
• Steel manufacturing (Deshpande & Modak 2002)
• Water and utilities (Fynn, Basson, Sinkoff, Moubray & Nadeau 2007)
• Nuclear (Deshpande & Modak 2002b, pg. 3) (Chen & Zhu 2008)
• Space exploration (NASA space shuttle) (Hauge, Stevens, Loomis Jr & Ghose
2000)
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The author could not find examples of academically published RCM analyses of heavy-
haul diesel locomotive engines, or heavy diesel engines in other applications.
2.4 Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM)
2.4.1 Inception
The RCM process was first documented by F. S. Nowlan and H. S. Heap of United
Airlines in 1978 (Nowlan & Heap 1978, pg. vii) for the US Department of Defence.
It is considered a seminal work that documented state-of-the-art maintenance in the
aviation industry at that time (Netherton 2002). In the 1980’s, John Moubray and
associates were able to take this maintenance approach and apply it to other industries,
culminating in RCMII, which employed the same philosophy as RCM, but treated
environmental risks with much more importance (Moubray 2001) (Netherton 2002).
The success of RCM and RCMII led to a number of maintenance programmes being
developed and called ‘RCM’ that did not strictly follow the philosophy proposed by
Nowlan and Heap. Industries embarking on an RCM program could not be assured of
the validity of a program being offered by a consultant. To counter this problem, the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) standards JA1011 and JA were published in
1999, not to provide an RCM methodology, but to provide a standard against which
to assess whether a commercial maintenance program is RCM-based or not (Moubray
2001, pg. 326) (Netherton 2002).
2.4.2 RCM Definition
Moubray (2001) defines Reliability-centered Maintenance as “a process used to deter-
mine what must be done to ensure that any physical asset continues to do what its users
want it to do in its present operating context”. Standards Australia (2011) introduces
RCM as “. . . a method to identify and select failure management policies to efficiently
and effectively achieve the required safety, availability and economy of operation”. Rau-
sand (1998) quotes the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) definition: “a system-
atic consideration of system functions, the way functions can fail, and a priority-based
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consideration of safety and economics that identifies applicable and effective PM tasks”.
Three ideas link the above definitions:
• RCM is a systematic methodology rather than a set of instructions.
• The equipment has performance standards, operating requirements and an op-
erating context. The results of the analysis will be determined by these unique
criteria.
• The methodology focusses on maintaining functions rather than the equipment
itself (Rausand 1998).
2.4.3 RCM Objectives
Standards Australia (2011, pg. 13 - 15) and Moubray (2001, pg. 18, 308-317) identifies
the following objectives and benefits of an RCM analysis:
• Develop maintenance schedules, involving the following sub-objectives:
– Select more appropriate maintenance activities to lift the equipment relia-
bility.
– Reduce costs and increase availability by eliminating unnecessary mainte-
nance tasks and optimising preventive maintenance tasks.
– Identify equipment deficiencies that require redesign.
– Develop maintenance documentation to satisfy future maintenance audits.
– Development of a knowledge database that provides a clear demonstration
of the purpose of all maintenance tasks.
– Provide a foundation for maintenance program revision through time.
• Create asset operating procedures.
• Reduce safety and environmental risk.
• Extend equipment life.
• Imbue a higher level of plant and machinery knowledge to the company.
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2.4.4 When to perform an RCM Analysis
RCM is well-suited to applications involving complex machinery that is in service
and has a generic maintenance regime (Moubray 2001, pg. 79), but is operating in
a unique and demanding context that may have significant safety and environmental
risks (Deshpande & Modak 2002b, pg. 33).
Standards Australia (2011, pg. 30) indicates that an RCM analysis performed during
design will offer the best outcomes, as it can influence design decisions. Netherton
(2002) provides an example of designing a casing to fail by ductile deformation as
opposed to brittle failure, but goes on to say that RCM was developed for those re-
sponsible for maintaining the asset, not the design engineer. Moubray (2001, pg. 312)
agrees with the Australian Standard; however, Moubray (2001, pg. 77-79) and Rausand
(1998) assert that equipment manufacturers and third parties are rarely in a position
to provide a quality FMEA for a RCM-based maintenance regime, for the following
reasons:
• Most manufacturers do not operate and maintain their equipment, removing a
fundamental information source for performing an RCM analysis.
• Manufacturers may be aware of failures but usually do not have access to opera-
tional information to understand the failure modes.
• The manufacturer often does not have access to operating context, performance
standards and failure consequences, or it may not be viable to manufacture items
to suit these parameters in a production line scenario.
• Designers may be less inclined to admit that the equipment can fail.
• Recommendations by the manufacturer for scheduled replacement will have a
conflict of interest as the manufacturer will benefit from spare parts sales.
• Legal liability concerns may influence the manufacturer to prescribe more main-
tenance than is necessary.
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2.5 Reliability-Centered Maintenance Methodology
2.5.1 Planning and Preparation
The literature reviewed by the author recommends that the following points are con-
sidered and attended to prior to attempting an RCM:
1. Establish participant prior experience and knowledge. The following knowledge
base underpins a successful RCM analysis, and if not available needs to be devel-
oped:
• RCM experience
• Knowledge of equipment and operational context
• Knowledge of equipment condition, failures modes and effects
• Access to relevant safety and environmental legislation or regulations
• Understanding of maintenance practicalities, processes and costs
(Standards Australia 2011, pg. 17)
Moubray (2001, pg. 267) agrees with this concept, and advises that the RCM
group should include five or six participants, including operators, tradesmen,
their respective front-line supervisors, engineers and, where appropriate, external
technical specialist advisors. Particularly for new assets, Moubray (2001, pg. 78)
believes that the manufacturer’s field service technicians can be of great value,
when coupled with the day-to-day maintainers and operators who understand the
operating context and failure effects.
The facilitator has the most significant effect on the quality of the analysis.
Moubray (2001, pg. 269-277) recommends the facilitator is a technical and me-
thodical person with good people skills. Further, they should understand the
asset to be analysed, but not be a subject matter expert. The facilitator must be
competent in the following areas:
• Applying RCM logic
• Directing and managing the analysis
• Conducting meetings
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• Time management
• Administration, logistics and communication
2. Establish objectives. Netherton (2002) explains that each RCM will have different
priorities and objectives, as discussed in section 2.4.3.
3. Define the level of analysis. A high-level analysis may miss important failure
modes and detail, while a low-level analysis may become overwhelming (Rausand
1998) (Netherton 2002). Moubray (2001, pg. 80-89) advises that the FMEA
analysis level can be adjusted as new information comes to light during the RCM
analysis. If there are less than six failure modes per sub-system, the analyst should
consider incorporating the failure modes into a higher level system. If there are
greater than 10 failure modes per sub-system, it may be worth analysing some of
the assemblies separately.
Smith & Hinchcliffe (2003, pg. 75) broadly defines the levels of analysis as:
• Part - the smallest component that can be disassembled from the equipment
assembly without damage.
• Component - an assembly of parts that perform a significant function.
• System - a set of components that provide a fundamental function for the
plant operation.
• Plant - An assembly of equipment that takes raw input materials and pro-
cesses them into output products.
Smith & Hinchcliffe (2003, pg. 75-76) recommends that the RCM is performed
at a system level, based on the following reasons:
• Equipment is often designed and built at the system level, so the RCM
is congruent with the plant construction, enabling boundaries to be easily
defined.
• Analysis at the component level can mask the true impact of a failure, as
the RCM is focussed on component failures and may miss the big picture.
• Analysis at the highest plant level may include a large number of functions.
This can result in the analysis becoming large, cumbersome and confusing.
4. Define the asset/system boundaries. Netherton (2002) and Rausand (1998) agree
that the analysis level, system boundaries and analysis approach to interfaces
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need to be documented during the planning stage (Standards Australia 2011, pg.
18).
Smith & Hinchcliffe (2003, pg. 82-86) emphasises that boundaries must be defined
and documented precisely, and, if done well, generates the following benefits:
• Where system overlap occurs and no clear boundary exists, a precise def-
inition prevents the same work being completed twice when analysing the
interfacing systems.
• The inputs and outputs are clearly understood, helping to clarify the system
functions.
Smith & Hinchcliffe (2003, pg. 82-86) goes on to discuss a pragmatic approach
to defining boundaries. He does not give a set of rules, but provides some specific
examples that indicate the boundaries should be set to group items that support
a system function. One such example is that of the lubrication system - while
a component may include lubrication, the lubrication system itself may service
many components. As such, the lubrication functions in each component should
be grouped and analysed as part of the lubrication system. These system group-
ings, and any special cases, must be documented precisely. Smith suggests the
format in figures 2.1 and 2.2.
5. Prioritise assets/systems. Rausand (1998) and Netherton (2002) indicate that this
is a controversial step; some RCM methodologies argue that this is not important
and wastes time, as every asset requires analysis. Proponents of prioritisation and
justification believe that some assets do not justify analysis, and prioritisation
focusses the RCM resources appropriately. Moubray (2001, pg. 16) agrees that
assets should be prioritised and Standards Australia (2011, pg. 15-16) advises
that the analyst needs to identify the systems that will benefit most from RCM
and produce a listing of items ranked by criticality and priority. Assets can be
assessed against the following criteria:
• Availability/reliability performance
• Safety incidents
• Maintenance backlog
• Maintenance costs/efficiency
• Proportion of corrective work to preventive work
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Figure 2.1: Boundary Overview (Smith & Hinchcliffe 2003, pg. 85)
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Figure 2.2: Boundary Definition (Smith & Hinchcliffe 2003, pg. 86)
• Maintenance technology used
Smith & Hinchcliffe (2003, pg. 76-79) is a strong advocate of prioritising assets,
advising that some equipment does not justify resource allocation. The Pareto
Principle (80 percent of the effects are the result of 20 percent of the causes or
actions) is introduced as a practical tool to determine the assets which are likely
to provide the best return on investment from RCM analysis resources.
A Pareto analysis builds a histogram based on a suite of assets and a performance
parameter, which are then sorted from the largest performance parameter result
to the smallest. Naturally, the assets that display the worst performance are
prioritised first, as the Pareto Principle indicates that these assets will require
the least effort to make the biggest improvement in performance. An example
chart is provided in figure 2.3.
Smith & Hinchcliffe (2003, pg. 77) advises that the analysis is kept simple. The
following data should be easily obtained and is sufficient to provide direction to
the analyst:
• Corrective maintenance expenditure (2 year period)
• Count of corrective maintenance events (2 year period)
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Figure 2.3: Pareto Chart(Smith & Hinchcliffe 2003, pg. 79)
• Downtime (2 year period)
As discussed earlier, Standards Australia (2011, pg. 15-16) indicates that plant
should be assessed against reliability and availability performance. Besnard, Fis-
cher & Bertling (2010) describes reliability performance using downtime and num-
ber of failures, which is similar to the criteria set out by Smith & Hinchcliffe (2003,
pg. 77).
6. Define the operating context. The operating context is defined during RCM
preparation, and is to be documented for use with the analysis and as evidence
afterwards (Standards Australia 2011, pg. 17-18). Standards Australia (2011, pg.
17-18), Moubray (2001, pg. 28-35) and Society of Automotive Engineers (2002)
indicate that the operating context documents general knowledge of:
• How the equipment is operated, operating parameters and demand/duty
cycle.
– Is the process a batch or flow process, and what is the volume of work-
in-progress (WIP)? Batch processes may mitigate some of the failure
effects, but a flow process may shut down the entire plant when one
piece of equipment fails.
– Equipment redundancy.
– Operating hours - shift or continuous.
• Climate and environmental considerations.
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• Failure rates, time-to-repair and spare part lead times.
• Health, safety, environmental and quality standards.
• Equipment/system interfaces, and how the analysis will deal with these.
• Economic climate, market demand and raw material supply.
7. Gather information and data. Information to be collated during the preparation
stage will include:
• Operating procedures
• Equipment/System Bill Of Materials (BOM)
• Applicable novel maintenance techniques
• Methodologies for calculating potential to functional failure intervals and
task intervals
• Appropriate reliability analyses
• Relevant regulations and legislation
• Safety assessments, incident, accident and failure reports
• Technical manuals, schematics, assembly drawings and manufacturer’s hand-
books
• Existing maintenance procedures and preventive maintenance tasks
• Spare parts usage rates
(Standards Australia 2011, pg. 18-19)
Standards Australia (2011, pg. 16) advises that maintenance history data sources
alone are insufficient for the RCM analysis and can even be misleading. Moubray
(2001, pg. 250-255) supports this strongly. Data needs to be augmented by
evidence from maintenance personnel and equipment inspection.
2.5.2 Introduction to the Seven Questions of RCM
Moubray (2001, pg. 7-16, 210-211), Netherton (2002) and Society of Automotive En-
gineers (2009) explicitly deal with the seven questions in discrete steps:
1. What are the asset functions?
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2. How does it fail to fulfil the asset functions?
3. What is the physical condition or event that causes the function to fail?
4. What are the effects of the failure?
5. What are the consequences of the failure?
6. Can a proactive action be taken to prevent the failure?
7. If it is not possible to proactively prevent the failure, what can be done?
Rausand (1998) and Standards Australia (2011) give a somewhat implicit treatment,
grouping a number of the questions together into a single step. This project will deal
with each question separately as proposed by Moubray (2001), Society of Automotive
Engineers (2009) and Netherton (2002).
2.5.3 Function Definition
What are the functions and associated performance standards of the asset
in its present operating context?
Moubray (2001, pg. 8) and Society of Automotive Engineers (2002) define primary
and secondary functions. Primary functions are the reason for the asset’s existence,
i.e. the reason it was purchased. Secondary functions address the environment, safety
and human interface factors. Secondary functions may be more critical than primary
functions. Additionally, functions can be ‘hidden’, meaning that the function (and
failure) is not apparent under normal operation (e.g. seizure of a safety valve).
Function definition will take 30% of the time for the entire RCM (Moubray 2001, pg.
8) and (Netherton 2002). This is consistent with the RCM philosophy of focussing on
equipment functions, not equipment per se (Deshpande & Modak 2002b).
Standards Australia (2011, pg. 20-21), Moubray (2001, pg. 22-44), Society of Automo-
tive Engineers (2002) and Netherton (2002) detail the following salient points:
• The structure of a function statement includes a verb, object and performance
standard. The operating context of the function needs to be included, but may
2.5 Reliability-Centered Maintenance Methodology 21
be included as a separate text description where applicable.
• A quantitative performance standard should be specified (where applicable) or
an absolute standard inferred.
• Secondary functions need to be considered (e.g. lubricating oil containment).
• Protective functions must identify when the protection would apply.
2.5.4 Functional Failure Definition
In what ways does the asset fail to fulfil its functions?
Failed states are described by Moubray (2001, pg. 46-47) as functional failures because
they are defined by an inability to fulfil a certain function to the required standard.
Standards Australia (2011, pg. 21-22) categorises functional failures as:
• Complete functional loss
• Partial loss of function
• Intermittent functional loss
• Functioning at the wrong time (e.g. a low oil pressure alarm giving false alarms)
Rausand (1998) adds that the functional failures need to be classified into sudden or
gradual failures, but does not provide a strong reason for this classification. Standards
Australia (2011), Moubray (2001) and Netherton (2002) do not provide any support
for this and indicate that sudden or gradual failures are dealt with in Questions 3 and
4, the failure modes and effects analysis.
Netherton (2002) writes that functional failures are simple and precise to write if the
functions have been well defined initially.
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2.5.5 Failure mode definition
What causes each functional failure?
A Failure mode is defined as the physical condition or event that causes the functional
failure, under ‘reasonably likely’ conditions. The term ‘reasonably likely’ should be
interpreted with respect to the operating context, as rare failure modes that have
catastrophic consequences must be addressed.
A quality failure mode description will include an object and a verb, which is an
identification of the physical item and the mechanism by which the item failed.
The failure mode should be consistent with the failure management strategies avail-
able and provide enough information to select a failure management strategy. As an
example, a slurry pump failure mode may be described as ‘impeller worn out of adjust-
ment’, which can be managed by periodic inspection and adjustment. In this instance
there is little to be gained by specifying the failure mode at the impeller metallurgical
composition level, because it is the impeller clearance that will be maintained.
(Moubray 2001, pg. 54) (Standards Australia 2011, pg. 21-22) (Society of Automotive
Engineers 2009) (Society of Automotive Engineers 2002)
Other considerations when determining failure modes should be:
• Failure modes that have occurred previously, and those being prevented by current
preventive maintenance, should be included.
• Opportunities for operator error causing failure.
• Environmentally-induced failure modes.
• Known design deficiencies.
• Human error. Standards Australia (2011, pg. 22) suggests that human error
may or may not be included depending on resources and organisational context.
These modes may be listed for completeness but not analysed further. Moubray
(2001, pg. 70) indicates that if the error is thought to be reasonably likely, then
it should be included.
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Moubray (2001, pg. 77-80,266-267) identifies that tradesmen, frontline supervisors and
OEM field service technicians are key sources of information for failure modes and
failure effects. (Failure effects are described in Question 4.)
A thorough assessment of failure modes forms the basis of a proactive maintenance
effort; it is considering all of the things that could potentially go wrong before they
happen (or happen a second time in some cases), such that appropriate failure man-
agement policies can be implemented (Moubray 2001, pg. 55).
Rausand (1998) defines failure modes as “the manner by which a failure is observed,
and is defined as non-fulfilment of one of the functions”. Netherton (2002) identifies
this definition as the traditional design FMEA failure mode definition. This definition
will not be pursued further in this project.
2.5.6 Failure effects evaluation
What happens when each failure occurs?
Failure effects describe the events that follow a failure mode. It is important to dif-
ferentiate between effects (Question 4) and consequences (Question 5). Failure effects
describe what happens when the failure occurs and the consequences describe how the
failure matters (safety, operational, etc.) and the severity of the failure (Moubray 2001,
pg. 73).
The failure effect describes the ‘reasonably likely’ most severe effects of failure when
no action is taken to detect or prevent the failure (Standards Australia 2011, pg. 22).
Netherton (2002) agrees and adds that the ‘no action taken’ restriction enables the true
consequence of failure and benefit of maintenance tasks to be assessed.
Netherton (2002) and Standards Australia (2011, pg. 22) note that a quality failure
description includes the information required to thoroughly assess the consequences
(Question 5). Moubray (2001, pg. 73 - 77) and Society of Automotive Engineers (2002)
express similar ideas and discuss the items that a quality failure effect description will
include:
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• Evidence of failure - alarms and physical effects (smoke, product leakage, etc.)
• Safety and environmental effects
• Operational and production effects
• Physical (secondary) damage caused
• How the failure is repaired
The level of detail of the effects need to be explored and documented at the subsystem,
system and the overarching plant level, so that the failure effects are viewed holistically
and are comparable with each other (Standards Australia 2011, pg. 22).
2.5.7 Failure consequence evaluation
In what way does each failure matter?
Assessing the failure consequences categorises and evaluates risk. Question 5 works
with Question 6 (What can be done to predict or prevent failure?) and 7 (What should
be done if a suitable maintenance task cannot be found?) to assess the proposed main-
tenance tasks against the ‘technically feasible’ and ‘worth doing’ criteria. Evaluating
the risk associated with a failure determines the resources allocated to a task, as it
determines whether a task is ‘worth doing’. This concept counters the idea that ‘all
failures must be prevented’ and is a key concept in the RCM methodology.
Moubray (2001, pg. 91) classifies failure consequences into four broad consequence
categories (RCM2 decision diagram, figure 2.4):
• Safety and environmental
• Operational
• Non-operational
• Hidden failures, which are distinct from evident failures and require special treat-
ment
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Figure 2.4: RCM2 Decision Diagram (Moubray 2001, pg. 200-201)
Netherton (2002) classifies consequences in the same manner as Moubray (2001), except
that environmental consequences are a separate category from safety.
Referring to figure 2.5, Standards Australia (2011, pg. 25-26) classifies the failures into
the following categories:
• Evident, safety and environmental
• Evident, operational/economic
• Hidden, safety and environmental
• Hidden, operational/economic
Evident Failures are defined by their noticeable effects, which may be as simple as
a warning light or as catastrophic as plant process interruption and damage to
personnel or the environment. The failure does not have to be evident instantly
but it does have to be evident on its own, not requiring another failure, inspection
or ‘failure-finding’ activities to be detected (Moubray 2001, pg. 92-93).
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Figure 2.5: AS IEC 60300.3.11 RCM Decision Diagram (Standards Australia 2011, pg. 25)
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Hidden Failures are the result of protective functions that are not fail-safe. They
are not detectable on their own under normal operating circumstances and are
defined by a lack of the symptoms seen with evident failures. Their undetected
failure may allow a second failure (‘multiple failure’) to occur, whose consequences
are likely to be significant. Hidden failures require a ‘failure-finding’ activity to
discover the fault.
The example provided is that of a stand-by pump. If the shaft bearings seize, the
seizure will not be discovered unless the duty pump fails and the stand-by pump
is called upon to perform but fails (this would be considered a ‘multiple failure’),
or unless the stand-by pump is tested.
A maintenance task to prevent failure of the hidden function is considered ‘tech-
nically feasible’ if it reduces the probability of multiple failure to a tolerably low
level. It is considered ‘worth doing’ if the value of the task outweighs the cost of
the task.
(Moubray 2001, pg. 92, 114-116) (Society of Automotive Engineers 2002)
Safety and Environmental Consequences are failures that cause injury or death
to people and failures that breach any local, state or national regulations (Moubray
2001, pg. 94-95). The RCM process does not tolerate inaction on safety or en-
vironmental risks and they must be reduced to a tolerably low level. As such,
proactive maintenance tasks are only ‘worth doing’ if they reduce the risk to
a tolerably low level (Moubray 2001, pg. 102). It is important to note that
secondary damage caused by a failure is sometimes confused with safety conse-
quences, but RCM classifies secondary damage as ‘non-operational’ consequences
(Netherton 2002).
Operational Consequences Standards Australia (2011, pg. 26) classifies opera-
tional consequences as those that cause a degradation of capability, reduced pro-
duction, or failure to complete a journey on-time. Netherton (2002) agrees, and
emphasises the effect of lost sales on 24-hour production plants. Moubray (2001)
notes that the following parameters are affected:
• Total output
• Product quality
• Customer service (particularly in scheduled or time-based products like trans-
port)
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• Operating costs (in addition to the cost of repair)
A proactive maintenance task is only ‘worth doing’ if the cost of the task is less
than the economic effects of failure. The economic effects are quantified by how
much the failure costs and how often it occurs (Moubray 2001, pg. 105-106).
Netherton (2002) believes that indirect operational impacts should be measured.
An example is to calculate the redundancy level utilised to support the operation,
adding indirect costs. Moubray (2001, pg. 108) urges the team to thoroughly
assess whether the task is ‘worth doing’, in either a formal, quantitative manner
or intuitively (as appropriate). Many teams display a tendency to evaluate tasks
only against the ‘technically feasible’ criteria, yielding maintenance programs that
cost more than the failures they prevent.
RCM recommends that if a maintenance task, redesign or process change is not
‘worth doing’ and the failure consequences are tolerable, the best maintenance
strategy may be ‘Run To Failure’; that is, perform no maintenance and accept
the failures (Moubray 2001, pg. 106-107).
Non-operational consequences are described by Standards Australia (2011, pg.
26) as ‘economic’ and defined by Netherton (2002) as any failure that matters
because it requires repair but does not affect safety, environment or the opera-
tion. Moubray (2001, pg. 109-110) re-emphasises the message that these failures
should only be prevented if the cost of maintenance is less than the cost of failure.
Two further points to be considered are:
• Secondary damage should be included in the assessment of failure cost.
• Protected functions, such as a duty pump with a redundant standby, may
be classified as a non-operational failure but the implication is that the
protective function must be maintained as well.
(Moubray 2001, pg. 95-101,110)
The analyst may evaluate risk to determine the severity of consequences and resources
available to prevent the failure. This should be performed in a group (Moubray 2001,
pg. 101) and can be assisted by using a matrix similar to figure 2.6. The likelihood
(left hand column) can be determined quantitatively (reliability data) or qualitatively
(engineering judgement), as long as the approach is consistent. The consequence sever-
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Figure 2.6: AS IEC 60300.3.11 Criticality Determination Matrix (Standards Australia 2011,
pg. 39)
ity levels are defined according to the organisation’s context. The result of this analysis
is a risk ranking for each failure mode. The example in figure 2.6 has three risk val-
ues, ranging from one (unacceptable) to three (minor) (Standards Australia 2011, pg.
22-23).
2.5.8 Proactive maintenance task selection
6. What can be done to predict or prevent each failure?
Question 6 assesses ‘proactive’ maintenance tasks. Proactive tasks are divided into
three categories: scheduled restoration, discard, or on-condition (Moubray 2001, pg.
129).
Standards Australia (2011, pg. 26) recommends that the failure mode characteristics
are assessed to determine the maintenance tasks that will be ‘technically feasible’ for
each failure mode. There are six failure patterns (figure 2.7), and the relationship
between age and failure risk is a key concept (Moubray 2001, pg. 130) (Society of
Automotive Engineers 2002). The analyst is warned not to use plant historical records
alone as the basis for this assessment, for the following reasons:
• The complexity of equipment failure can be enormous - a functional failure can
be caused by numerous failure modes. Historical data often does not record
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Figure 2.7: AS IEC 60300.3.11 Six Failure Patterns (Standards Australia 2011, pg. 42)
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information to this level of detail.
• A plant may only contain a small number of a particular asset type, and these
assets may be modified over time. This means there is an insufficient sample size.
• Many plants struggle with consistent and complete reporting, eroding the quality
of historical data.
• Maintenance programs are designed to prevent failures, and hence failure data.
• Historical data, by nature, is backward-looking, while RCM strives to be proactive
and forward-looking.
Moubray asserts that RCM focusses on the information needed to justify specific de-
cisions, so historical data is to be used but not solely relied upon (Moubray 2001, pg.
250-255).
The failure management policies are detailed below:
• Scheduled Replacement and Scheduled Restoration tasks are defined by mainte-
nance based on time, not condition.
Restoration is technically feasible when the equipment exhibits a clear wear-out
pattern, as described in figure 2.7, and restoration will renew the equipment’s
resistance to failure. Scheduled replacement and restoration can still be applicable
when an item has a steadily increasing failure rate with age and does not affect
safety or the environment.
If the restoration or replacement task is addressing safety related consequences,
a conservative interval (‘safe life’) is chosen to prevent any failures but if it is
addressing operational effects, the maintenance cost and failure cost will be com-
pared to determine the ‘economic’ or ‘useful’ life.
If quality failure data is available, reliability data analytical techniques such as the
Weibull distribution can be used to determine the task interval. Moubray notes
that if this data is not available, key items should be subject to ‘age exploration’
upon entry to service.
(Standards Australia 2011, pg. 29), (Moubray 2001, pg. 134-140)
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Figure 2.8: AS IEC 60300.3.11 P-F curve (Standards Australia 2011, pg. 28)
• On-condition tasks are performed when a scheduled condition monitoring task
indicates that the equipment will fail sometime in the future. Condition mon-
itoring is applied to detect potential failures (P) before they become functional
failures (F) (figure 2.8). Potential failures are detectable and measureable. Po-
tential failures display consistent signs of degradation, which may include wear
particles, oil consumption, vibration, noise and temperature changes.
Detecting these early signs of failure gives the maintenance and production de-
partments the opportunity to mitigate, or even eliminate, failure consequences
by:
– Organising materials and labour ahead of time;
– Arranging the best possible time for equipment outage; and
– Identifying any other opportune maintenance.
For a condition monitoring task to be ‘technically feasible’, the conditions listed
must be met:
– The deterioration can be detected and measured.
– The inspection interval (if monitoring is not continuous) must be shorter
than the P-F interval (refer to figure 2.8).
– The P-F interval allows enough time to organise corrective maintenance.
– The failure mode exhibits a relatively stable and predictable P-F interval.
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Condition monitoring tasks do not need to be high-tech and some tasks only
require the human senses. Moubray (2001, pg. 150)warns that high-tech condition
monitoring can be ‘spectacularly effective when appropriate, but when they are
inappropriate they can be a very expensive. . . waste of time’.
(Standards Australia 2011, pg. 28-29) (Moubray 2001, pg. 144-150)
2.5.9 Default maintenance task selection
7. What should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found?
Question 7 assesses ‘default actions’, which can be ‘failure-finding’, ‘run-to-failure’, or
equipment redesign.
Failure-finding tasks evaluate the integrity of a hidden function at scheduled intervals
and may take the form of an inspection, partial function test or full function test.
Failure-finding tasks are used if proactive maintenance is not sufficient to ensure
a tolerable level of risk (which is common for hidden functions). This type of task
is generally applied to test hidden redundancy functions (e.g. a backup pump)
or protective functions (e.g. a safety relief valve) that are rarely activated.
The task is considered ‘technically feasible’ if:
• The task is physically able to be done.
• The task does not mean that the system is left unprotected and at risk of
failure.
• The calculated failure-finding interval is sensible.
The goal of a failure finding task is to reduce the probability of multiple failure
(failure of the protective function and protected function simultaneously) to an
acceptable level. If the task is not capable of this, it is not ‘worth doing’.
A fundamental consideration when implementing a failure-finding task is the in-
spection interval. There are a number of ways of determining the scheduled
interval, presented by both Moubray (2001, pg. 176-177) and Standards Aus-
tralia (2011, pg. 40-41). These calculations were not required in this research
project; as such, they are not included.
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Run-to-failure is simply corrective maintenance - no preventive maintenance is ap-
plied and the asset is repaired or replaced when failure occurs. It is valid for both
hidden and evident failures when:
• There are no environmental or safety consequences resulting from failure.
• There are no preventive tasks that are ‘worth doing’ to counter the failure;
the cost of preventing failure outweighs the cost of the failure.
(Moubray 2001, pg. 187)
Redesign is the final default action. It is compulsory for environmental or safety con-
sequences and may be desirable, based on economic cost-benefit, for operational
or non-operational consequences.
Redesign is only considered after checking all maintenance options to gain the
required performance (Moubray 2001, pg.107). RCM investigates maintenance
first because:
• Moubray (2001, pg. 189) makes the point that redesign projects can take
six months to three years to implement. During that time, a safety or
environmental risk may be active, but the RCM process mandates action.
In this instance, Standards Australia (2011, pg. 30) recommends evaluating
operational restrictions, temporary modifications or maintenance strategies
previously rejected.
• There are often numerous redesign opportunities in a plant and only the
most beneficial can be completed (Moubray 2001, pg. 189).
Redesign generates economic benefits when it:
• Reduces failure frequency
• Mitigates or eliminates the failure consequences
• Is cheaper than the current maintenance method
(Moubray 2001, pg. 107)
Redesign may take the form of:
• Changing equipment specifications
• Replacing or substituting the machine or device for a more reliable unit
• Changing the plant process or operating procedure
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• Duplicating the equipment or protective functions
• Change the configuration to make a preventive maintenance task cheaper.
• Add another protective device that will make a hidden failure evident
• Training employees.
The cost-benefit of redesign may be difficult to determine, and the following
questions are suggested for evaluation:
1. Does the equipment have enough life left to justify the redesign cost?
2. Is the unreliability of the equipment intolerable?
3. Are the failure consequences intolerable?
4. Are the maintenance resources consumed by the asset too high?
5. Will redesign reduce overall costs?
6. Is redesign likely to succeed, given the technology and expertise available?
7. Does a cost-benefit analysis justify the investment?
(Moubray 2001, pg. 188-197)
2.5.10 Common Mistakes
Moubray (2001, pg. 286-290) identifies the following mistakes when applying RCM:
• The analysis is carried out at the wrong level, leading to a superficial (and po-
tentially dangerous) analysis or an analysis that is bogged down in too much
detail.
• Too much emphasis on historical records and failure data - see section 2.5.8.
• The analysis is performed by one person, not a group. Moubray asserts that one
person alone cannot possess all the knowledge required to perform the analysis -
refer to 2.5.1.
• Failure to include operators in the review. RCM is a holistic maintenance method-
ology and requires active engagement and enthusiasm from the equipment oper-
ators.
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• Engaging the manufacturer to apply RCM independently is not considered effec-
tive, for reasons detailed in section 2.4.4. Engaging the manufacturer to partici-
pate in the RCM is positive.
• Engaging third parties to perform the RCM is not recommended because they
may not have sufficient understanding of the operating context, contractual ar-
rangements can disrupt the RCM process, and once the consultant leaves after
finishing the project, there may be a lack of program ownership within the or-
ganisation.
• Over-emphasising the value of computers in the process. Much of the RCM pro-
cess can be completed by a computer (Gabbar et al. 2003), but Moubray asserts
that software cannot replace experienced tradesmen, operators and engineers.
2.6 Diesel Engine Condition Monitoring
2.6.1 Oil Sampling and Analysis
Spectrographic Analysis
Macian, Tormos, Olmeda & Montoro (2003) write that spectrography is the most widely
used method of analysing oil contaminant particles. It is used to determine the elements
and compounds that make up the contaminating particles, giving clues about which
engine components may be deteriorating or what types of contaminants are entering the
system. Thomas (2014) and Cummins Filtration (2014) support this, both providing a
table of wear elements and the likely source.
The primary limitation of spectrography is that it only detects elements up to a certain
size (Macian et al. 2003). Roylance (2005) supports this, indicating the maximum size
is approximately 10 micrometres. Roylance (2005) advises that, for magnetic particles,
this limitation is partly mitigated by using the Particle Quantifier (PQ) Index.
The PQ index measurement is an arbitrary index that does not convert to a unit
of measurement. It is taken by subjecting an oil sample to a magnetic field. The
magnetic field is disrupted proportionally to the amount of magnetic material in the
sample. If the PQ index rises while the spectrography result stays constant, the test
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indicates that large wear particles are being generated. This result warrants further
investigation, using analytical ferrography (Johnson 2011).
Fuel Injection System Monitoring
Macian, Payri, Tormos & Montoro (2006) present a technique for monitoring fuel in-
jection systems using ferrography. A 100mL sample is taken, and magnets and a mem-
brane separate the particles from the sample. The particles are analysed using optical
and electron microscopy. Particles that can be detected include wear particles (sizes
greater than 30 micrometres indicate a problem), dust and assembly debris. The test
is focussed on detecting wear and incipient problems in high pressure and low pressure
pumps.
Other oil analysis techniques
A wide variety of oil analysis techniques are available and are explained by Roylance
(2005), Cummins Filtration (2014), Mollenhauer & Tschke (2010, pg. 369-370) and
Thomas (2014). However, these pertain to the lubricating oil system, which has not
been analysed; as such, they are considered out of the scope of this literature review.
2.6.2 Acoustic Emissions (AE) and Airborne Acoustics
Mba & Rao (2006, pg. 2-3, 7) write that analysis of the noise emitted from rotating
machinery can provide cost-effective, reliable, sensitive diagnostic tools that are more
sensitive than vibration analysis on machinery including pumps, gearboxes, bearings,
engines and rotating equipment. AE analysis analyses component surface acoustics
(discrete from vibration analysis), covering frequencies from 100kHz to 1MHz, while
Airborne Acoustics monitors sound transmitted through the air to a microphone. Emis-
sions are classified as continuous waveforms (e.g. turbulent fluid flow) or burst wave-
forms (e.g. meshing gears or rolling element bearing defects). Elamin, Fan, Gu & Ball
(2009) advise that AE has a higher Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) than vibration or
pressure measurement. Kim, Tan & Yang (2012) agree, but they write that the SNR
on combustion engines is lowered by severe noise generated by a variety of mechanical
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events. The primary drawback with both AE and airborne acoustics analysis is that the
sensor must be placed close to the source, or the signal will be subject to attenuation
and noise interference (Mba & Rao 2006, pg. 2-3) (Elamin et al. 2009).
The most popular applications of AE analysis on combustion engines are the non-
intrusive detection of cylinder valve leakage, valve lash faults and defective diesel in-
jectors, during operation (Salathiel, G 2014, pers. comm., 09 June)(Elamin et al.
2009)(Mba & Rao 2006). Elamin et al. (2009) presented a research paper detailing the
successful analysis of valve clearances through surface AE on a 2.5 litre Ford four-stroke
diesel engine. As the valve clearances were modified, the valve opening and closing tim-
ing changed and this was successfully detected and measured by the team. Lowe (2013)
presented similar work with successful results. In a later paper, Elamin et al. (2010)
successfully detected seeded injector faults in a four-stroke diesel engine. The faults
included:
• Injector opening pressure 15 % low
• Injector opening pressure 20 % high
• No fuel supply to the injector
Lowe (2013, pg. 73-76, 142-143) supports the detection of injector faults using AE and
was able to identify AE signatures for seeded faults including:
• Injectors delivering low fuel volumes (20% and 80% reductions were tested)
• No fuel supply to the injector
• Pintle type nozzles with incorrect pintle geometry and no pintle (indirect injection
engines only)
Albarbar, Gu & Ball (2010, pg. 15) were able to decompose the engine emissions to
measure piston slap, fuel injection, combustion and valve movements using airborne
acoustics. The measurement and data processing calculations were claimed to yield
promising results for detecting weak fuel injector springs under high load and low
speed. Elamin et al. (2010) supports Albarbar et al. (2010) by noting that combustion,
piston slap, fuel injection and valve impact are the most significant sources of AE in
an engine.
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Douglas, Steel & Reuben (2006) presented research on non-intrusive AE analysis of
the tribological behaviour of the piston ring and liner interface. The force exerted on
the piston sealing rings by the cylinder combustion gas pressure dominated the results,
limiting the ability to detect the piston ring and liner interface signal.
2.6.3 Other Condition Monitoring Tools
Cylinder Pressure Measurement
Cylinder pressure measurement provides data on parameters such as:
• Peak firing pressure
• Compression pressure
• Mean effective pressure
• Maximum pressure rate rise
• Other thermodynamic properties for combustion diagnosis
(Lowe 2013, pg. 12-14)
Windrock, Inc. (2013) markets products that require cylinder pressure monitoring,
indicating that the technique is well developed. However, Lowe (2013, pg. 12-14) writes
that cylinder pressure measurement has been used to evaluate engine condition in a
condition monitoring context, but is best suited to research, design and testing scenarios
due to the intrusive nature of the method. Lowe (2013, pg. 12-14) acknowledges
that piezo-electric sensors are being deployed in glow plugs, which may provide future
potential for non-intrusive cylinder pressure measurement.
Crank Angle Measurement
Crank angle measurement measures the small variations in angular acceleration and
speed, using pre-existing crank and cam sensors. The data obtained can be used to
calculate cylinder pressures and engine torque. It has been used to detect under-fuelling,
2.7 Life Data Analysis - The Weibull Distribution 40
misfiring and external high pressure fuel leaks, but is only capable of detecting faults
that are serious enough to affect the engine performance rather than detecting incipient
problems that are precursors to poor engine performance (Lowe 2013, pg. 14-16).
Exhaust Gas Analysis
The temperature of exhaust gas can be analysed to monitor fuel to air ratios, fuel
quality and cylinder power balance. Exhaust pressures can be analysed to provide
detection of misfiring cylinders, incorrect fuel delivery and incorrect exhaust valve lash.
The instrumentation is vulnerable to build-up of combustion by products, restricting
the ability of the sensors to obtain data (Lowe 2013, pg. 16-17).
2.7 Life Data Analysis - The Weibull Distribution
Inception
The Weibull distribution function was first made widely known by Waloddi Weibull in
his 1951 ASME Journal of Applied Mechanics paper ‘A statistical distribution function
of wide applicability’. The Weibull distribution is now regarded as the best practice
method for modelling equipment service life data (Weibull 1951) (Abernethy 2006, pg.
1.1).
Applications of Weibull analysis
The Weibull distribution can be used to model a wide variety of phenomena, but has
found particular relevance in the field of reliability engineering. It is established as
a robust, well known and versatile distribution used to model component life data
(O’Connor & Kleyner 2011, pg. 78). The Weibull distribution can be applied to large
failure datasets, but it can also be used with sample sizes as small as two or three
failures; the Weibull distribution is the best choice for any dataset with less than 20
failures (Abernethy 2006, pg. 1.2-1.3,1.6).
A Weibull analysis can serve to:
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• Benchmark equipment performance by comparing the characteristic life (η) against
known standards or other operations.
• Identify the failure pattern according to the β value(early life unreliability, ran-
dom failure or a wear-out failure mode).
• Forecast failure counts (directly aiding maintenance planning and spare parts
inventory analysis).
• Check and evaluate previously implemented failure countermeasures.
• Warranty and support cost predictions.
• Make recommendations to plant management for emergency failure management
policy selection.
(Meridium 2012, pg. 2), (Abernethy 2006, pg. 1.2)
The limitations of a Weibull analysis that an analyst should be aware of are:
• Mixed or unknown failure modes can cause inaccurate results. Ideally, a Weibull
analysis is performed on a single failure mode (Abernethy 2006, pg. 1.4).
• Small sample sizes reduce statistical relevance.
• Missing data points and incomplete datasets can compromise the results.
(Abernethy 2006, pg. 1.2)
Two Parameter Weibull Cumulative Failure Distribution Function
F (t) = 1− e−( tη )β (2.1)
where:
F (t) represents the cumulative failures,
t is time,
β is the ‘shape’ parameter,
η is the ‘scale’ parameter, or ‘characteristic life’. It represents the time at which 63.2%
of the population will have failed.
(O’Connor & Kleyner 2011, pg. 78)
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Weibull Probability Plot
The Weibull probability plot uses modified axes. The Y-axis is a double natural log-
arithm reciprical and the X-axis is a natural logarithm. When failure data that can
be modelled by the Weibull distribution is plotted on this chart, it will form a straight
line, of the form Y = mX + C.
ln(ln(
1
1− F (t))) = β(ln(t))− β(ln(η)) (2.2)
Where:
ln(ln( 11−F (t))) = Y
β = m
(ln(t)) = X
β(ln(η)) = C
(O’Connor & Kleyner 2011, pg. 78)
Data ranking and treatment of ‘censored’ data
O’Connor & Kleyner (2011, pg. 75-76) discuss the ranking of data and provide an
example of 5 specimens that fail at a service life of 100, 200, 300, 400 and 500 hours
respectively. In a rudimentary analysis, an analyst would infer that 20% of the popu-
lation will fail by 100 hours and 100% of the population fails by 500 hours. However,
given that each failure represents a point on a probability distribution, the percentage
must be adjusted. For a distribution such as the Weibull distribution that does not
usually match the normal distribution, the median rank may be used. For the sake of
an example, the algebraic approximation of the median rank is:
rj =
j − 0.3
N + 0.4
(2.3)
Where:
rj is the median rank
j is the failure number, listed from smallest to largest by service life
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N is the sample size
Data sets will often include data points that survived a service life and were then
removed from service, with no failure occurring. This data is counted as ‘censored’,
and mathematically affects the ranking of the failures in the dataset. This is achieved
by modifying the order number of each failure:
iti = iti−1 +Nti (2.4)
Where:
iti is the mean order number of the ith failure, similar to j in equation 2.3
iti−1 is the mean order number of the preceding failure
Nti is defined by:
Nti =
(n+ 1)− iti−1
1 + (n− nicensored+failed)
(2.5)
Where:
n is the total sample size
nicensored+failed is the number of items that have failed or were removed from service
prior to failure up until the ith data point.
Data required for Weibull analysis
To perform a Weibull analysis, the following data is required:
• Asset identification (particularly relevant for fleets of equipment)
• Installation date
• Failure date
• Failure mode
• Downtime (optional, used to improve accuracy of service life)
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If the equipment is not repaired or replaced to a new standard after failure (i.e. it is
‘as good as old’), the following information is also required:
• Number of components in a system or asset. For example, there may be 12 pumps
in a pump-set.
• At each event, the data must specify whether or not the system or asset was
returned to ‘as good as old’ or ‘as good as new’ condition.
• The number of components that failed at each failure event.
(Meridium 2012, pg. 3-4)
Interpreting Weibull results
The values of η and β provide the basis for interpreting the Weibull results. In general,
η indicates whether the equipment life is relatively short or long, while the β value
indicates the failure pattern of the equipment. For example:
β < 1, the equipment will fail more often early in life and the reliability will increase
with time. Generally, no time-based maintenance will improve the reliability.
β ≈ 1, the equipment will fail randomly. Time-based maintenance will neither improve
nor reduce the equipment reliability.
β > 1, the equipment will ‘wear out’ and scheduled maintenance should be undertaken
when the risk of failure becomes too great.
(Abernethy 2006, pg. 1.4)
A good Weibull probability plot will place all failures on a single linear line. ‘Doglegs’
or ‘corners’ in the data can indicate mixed failure modes, while curves can indicate a
dataset that does not fit the Weibull distribution (Abernethy 2006, pg. 1.8).
The Weibull results must be checked for Goodness Of Fit (GOF), to ensure that the
results are valid. The Rio Tinto Reliability Solution (RTRS) has the capability to use
the least squares linear regression method (greater than 0.9 is considered a good fit) or
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov method, which yields a ‘p-value’. If the ‘p-value’ is greater
than one minus the required confidence level, the results are considered accurate enough
to make a prediction (Meridium 2012, pg. 3).
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2.8.1 High Pressure Diesel Pumps
Pump Function
The primary function of the pump is to provide high pressure fuel to the injector.
Energy is supplied via a rotating camshaft and fuel delivery is controlled by the Engine
Control Unit via a solenoid (GE Transportation 2012a, sec. 7 pg. 3).
Pump Cavitation damage
Cavitation occurs when vapour bubbles are formed in a liquid below its vapour pressure
and the liquid is then subjected to a large, rapid rise in pressure. The bubbles collapse
with an explosive force, damaging and deforming the component surface (Asi 2006).
Due to the high pressures and pressure differentials in diesel injection systems, cavita-
tion is common and is accelerated when water is present (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg.
394).
Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 394) advise that high pressure diesel pumps are susceptible
to cavitation, providing the example of a pump plunger suffering cavitation damage.
The areas most susceptible to cavitation are the plunger and the pump housing, adja-
cent to the spill port.
Water Ingress
Water ingress will enable corrosion to take place and reduce the lubrication capacity
of the diesel, severely accelerating wear (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 395).
Dirt Ingress
Dirt ingress or fuel contaminants (including water) will degrade the lubricating prop-
erties of the fuel and lead to seizure (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 395).
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Wear
Wear is inevitable during service and if allowed to progress will decrease pump efficiency
and capability to deliver the appropriate amount of fuel (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 398)
(Macian et al. 2006).
2.8.2 High Pressure Diesel Injectors
Injector Functions
The functions of the diesel injector are to:
• Inject fuel precisely without leakage
• Atomise the fuel
• Direct the spray evenly throughout the cylinder without wetting the cylinder
walls and piston
(Dempsey 2008, 78)
Injector Cavitation damage
Asi (2006) examines a cracked injector and determines that the cause of failure is
cavitation, leading to fatigue cracking. Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 394) support this,
stating that cavitation can lead to wear, cracks and fatigue fractures.
Breakaway of the atomiser body (Uncapping)
Bejger (2011) presents a case study on injectors that have ‘uncapped’. Once uncapped,
the atomiser body is then a loose object in the cylinder that causes significant secondary
engine damage. One set of injectors failed due to a combination of poor quality fuel
and wear (unfortunately, no further detail is provided) while a second set failed due to
poor manufacture quality.
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Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 398) specifically discuss wear on the injector pin, which
allows the needle to lift further. This increases the energy stored in the injector spring,
which magnifies the impact of the needle reseating on the valve, leading to uncapping.
Seizure
Injector seizure affects the needle, making it seize in the injector body and fail to return
to the valve seat, allowing low pressure diesel to enter the cylinder. Low pressure fuel
will be ejected as a stream rather than in an atomised spray and may leak droplets
onto the piston.
Injector seizure may be caused by dirt particles and fuel with inappropriate lubrication
properties (Von Wielligh, Burger & Wilcocks 2003).
Leaking
If fuel droplets are leaked directly onto the piston and burn, the droplets will overheat
and melt the piston, causing engine failure. Leakage can be caused by a seized or worn
injector (Von Wielligh et al. 2003).
Poor spray pattern
Dempsey (2008, 79-80) states that a poor spray pattern can be caused by:
• Low injection pressure
• Injector seizure
• Broken injector spring
• Dirt or foreign material on the valve seat or injection port
• Injection port damage or abnormal wear
• Carbon build-up
• Uneven seat contact
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Von Wielligh et al. (2003) provides a case study on engine failure due to poor spray
pattern, describing cases showing that if fuel flows onto the cylinder walls, it will wash
away lubricating oil and lead to piston scuffing or seizure.
Spring failure
Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 396) advises that spring failure is generally caused by fatigue
cracking at the flat-ground ends of the springs or material weaknesses (inclusions or
surface finish defects).
2.8.3 Cylinder Liners
The cylinder liner is a heavy walled tube that performs the following functions:
• Provides the combustion chamber and sealing surfaces for the piston.
• Guides the piston.
• Retains oil within the surface honing for lubrication.
• Transfers heat to the coolant.
Cylinder liners are subjected to mechanical, thermal, chemical and tribological loads
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 291).
Tribological failure modes
Wear is an inevitable result of engine operation. Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 299-305)
identify the following modes as prominent in cylinder liner failure and broader engine
failures:
• At top dead centre (TDC) the lubricating oil film between the piston rings and
cylinder liner breaks down due to contact with extremely hot, pressurised com-
bustion gases. Sulfurous combustion by-products resulting from poor quality fuel
and excessive gas pressures can aggravate the problem (Greuter & Zima 2012,
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pg. 300). Dempsey (2008, pg. 207-208) agrees, noting that the wear is caused by
localised oil starvation and combustion related acids.
• Abrasive wear can be driven by poor quality fuel introducing wear particles, but
may also result from the carbon particles that are a by-product of the combustion
process itself. Abrasive wear ‘polishes’ the bore and removes the bore hone marks.
Bore polishing leads to poor cylinder sealing, increased oil consumption and piston
seizure due to oil starvation.
• Adhesive wear is caused by the fusion of two asperities on sliding surfaces; one of
the asperities is subsequently torn away from the cylinder liner (or piston sealing
ring) (Askeland & Phule´ 2006, pg. 832-833). Shuster, Mahler & Crysler (1999)
support this; evidence of the early stages of adhesive wear was found in an engine
during metallurgical analysis of a heavy duty diesel engine after testing.
Liner Pitting - Cavitation Corrosion
Mechanical movement and vibration of the cylinder liner induced by piston loading can
cause cavitation in wet cylinder liners. Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 305-307) note that
if there is enough oxygen in the coolant, the process can be accelerated and termed
cavitation corrosion.
Hercamp (1993, pg. 114-121) provides a detailed treatment of cavitation corrosion of
cylinder liners. A number of causes and contributing factors are identified in terms
of engine design for reducing vibration, but in the maintenance sphere of control,
coolant concentration and composition are important for preventing cavitation. Her-
camp (1993, pg. 114-121) provides further detail but this is considered out of the scope
of this literature review, as the cooling system has not been analysed.
Cracks and Fractures
Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 307-308) advise that cylinder liner cracking often occurs
around the top flange mounting in the jacket and is caused by incorrect head gasket,
component dimensions or installation. Poor coolant concentration or composition can
contribute to crack growth by introducing corrosive attack.
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2.8.4 Cylinder Head and Cylinder Jacket
The cylinder head forms the upper boundary of the combustion chamber and has the
following features and functions:
• Facilitates the flow of coolant and lubricating oil.
• Houses the intake and exhaust valves and valve seats and associated components
(springs, guides, etc.).
• Houses the fuel injector.
• Facilitates the flow of fresh air and combustion gases (courtesy of the valve train).
• Stiffens the engine structure. Dempsey (2008, pg. 139) promotes the cylinder
head as the head gasket backing plate; it is stated that the stiffness of the cylinder
head is the most important design feature.
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 309) (GE Transportation 2012a, sec. 10 pg. 3)
Large, heavy duty engine cylinder heads are made of iron (Dempsey 2008, pg. 139).
Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 310) specify nodular or lamellar grey cast iron or cast steel
for certain applications. Valve seats and guides are often replaceable inserts.
Cylinder head gasket failure
Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 317-318) identify that cylinder head gasket leaks can be
caused by:
• Poor assembly quality - if particles are trapped between the block, gasket and
head, the seal quality will be compromised.
• Engine overheating, causing physical degradation of the gasket material.
• Incorrect engine head stud torque or torqing procedure (Dempsey 2008, pg. 174-
175).
• Lack of maintenance of head gaskets that require re-torqing.
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The effects of cylinder head leaks include exhaust gases leaking into the cooling system
and coolant leaks into the cylinder, leading to hydraulic lock in the worst case (Greuter
& Zima 2012, pg. 318).
Cylinder head distortion
The cylinder head can become distorted due to overheating. Single-cylinder iron/steel
heads are less prone to cylinder head distortion than multiple cylinder aluminium heads.
Aluminium introduces different thermal expansion rates, and multiple cylinder heads
form a bigger component over which distortion can occur. Distortion can cause head
gasket leaks (Dempsey 2008, pg. 139, 164) (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 316).
Erosion and Corrosion
Erosion can occur in cylinder head coolant passages if the coolant contains fine particles
of an abrasive nature (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 315). Dempsey (2008, pg. 159) notes
that joins and interfaces (ports) should be thoroughly checked for erosion. Hercamp
(1993, pg. 114-121) discusses the importance of correct coolant concentration and
composition to prevent corrosion from enhancing cavitation or corrosion, as erosion-
corrosion acts much faster than either mechanism individually (Kosel 1992, pg. 199-
213).
Cylinder head cracking
Cylinder head cracks are caused by thermal and mechanical stresses. Thin webs that
bridge between exhaust valves or between intake valves are prone to cracking caused
by low-cycle thermal fatigue, due to engine load changes and starting. The cracking is
assisted by the high cycle mechanical loading (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 313-314).
A causal factor of thermal overloading is scale deposits in the cooling system, further
stressing the requirement for coolant with proper concentration and composition. These
deposits thermally insulate the area covered by the deposit, which causes overheating
to occur in small areas (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 313-314).
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Dempsey (2008, pg. 161-163) discusses the severity of cracks; any cracks that extend
between engine systems (such as cooling, lubrication, intake and exhaust or combustion)
render the component unserviceable, but cracks protruding a short distance in other
areas may not affect the service life of the component.
Manufacturing defects, including shrinkage voids and inclusions, can cause cracking
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 314).
2.8.5 Valve Train
The function of the valve train is to allow the intake of fresh air, seal the combustion
chamber and allow the exhaustion of combustion gases. The valve train is comprised
of the following major components:
• Valves, valve guides and valve seats to provide the sealing surface.
• Valve springs to hold the valve against the valve seat and away from the piston.
• Pushrods, cam followers and the rocker assembly to extract energy from the
rotating camshaft and depress the valve.
(Dempsey 2008, pg. 144-145) (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 318)
Valves and valve seats are subject to mechanical forces (opening and closing forces
and combustion pressure), cyclic thermal loads (intake valves reach 600 degrees Celsius
and exhaust valves can reach 1000 degrees Celsius during the combustion and exhaust
phase, and cool during intake and compression), tribological loads and hot chemical
corrosion (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 328-329). Exhaust valve seats experience harsher
service conditions due to higher thermal variation and corrosive by-products contained
in exhaust gases (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 330-331).
Valve springs are compressed and released at a high cycle rate, subjecting the compo-
nent to cyclic torsional loading. Valves must possess high resistance to fatigue cracking
by having a very good surface finish and being constructed from appropriate, homoge-
neous materials (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 322-323).
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The pushrods, cam followers and rocker assembly are subject to mechanical loads.
Pushrods are subject to compression loads as high as 40,000 Newtons. Cam followers
are subjected to the same loading but as Hertzian stresses (Greuter & Zima 2012) and
a boundary lubrication interface with the camshaft (Priest & Taylor 2000).
Burnt valve disc
Burnt valves occur when the valve is heated to the material melting point and the
material is removed by gas flow (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 333). This failure mode
can cause the removal of a large amount of material from the valve, eliminating the
ability to form a seal.
Dempsey (2008, pg. 167) writes that burnt valve discs can occur as a result of:
• Abnormal temperatures in the combustion chamber. Greuter & Zima (2012, pg.
332) advises this can be due to improper fuel injection.
• A cooling system fault.
• As a result of insufficient valve lash. The valve seat provides cooling for the
valve disc, so insufficient valve lash holds the disc off the valve seat, removing the
cooling capacity of the seat and leading directly to burnt valves.
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 332-333) adds further failure modes:
• Faulty valve rotation can allow the valve to overheat in a localised area.
– Valve rotator faults can occur due to valve stem misalignment, which raises
the friction resistance in the rotator, or due to contamination (Greuter &
Zima 2012, pg. 342).
• Deposits on the valve seat can inhibit cooling of the valve disc.
• If the valve does not seal properly against the seat, blow-by and overheating can
occur.
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Valve fatigue fracture
Valve fatigue fracture is most often caused by cyclical shock loading or bending (Dempsey
2008, pg. 167). Some of the common causal factors include:
• Vibration in the valve train (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 333-334).
• Weak springs, allowing:
– Valve float - the valve is not held tight against the cam roller and ‘floats’,
causing impact upon reseating.
– Valve bounce - upon reseating, the valve bounces on the valve seat (Dempsey
2008, pg. 167) (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 334).
• Excessive valve lash causes the valves to lift and reseat while the cam lobe is on
the flanks, causing impact (Dempsey 2008, pg. 167). The valve should reseat on
the cam lobe ramps, which are designed to decelerate the valve and lessen the
reseating force (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 343).
Valve wear
Valve seats can wear prematurely due to incorrect valve clearance settings, high velocity
abrasive particles in the gas flow, and overheated exhaust gases (Greuter & Zima 2012,
pg. 312,342). Exhaust valves are protected somewhat by the layer of hard-facing
and a build-up of non-metallic particles; however, heavy build-up combined with valve
rotators can cause scoring (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 335).
Valve seizure
The following causal factors for valve seizure are identified:
• Dempsey (2008, pg. 167) and Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 315) agree that carbon
and gum build-up can cause the valve stem to stick and seize.
– Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 335) advise that over-extended oil drain intervals
and incorrect oil can contribute to carbon build-up.
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• Fuel burning characteristics at low temperature can cause gum to build-up. Low
temperature can be caused by long periods at idle or excessively low operating
temperatures (Dempsey 2008, pg. 167).
• Ethylene glycol presence in the lubricating oil can contribute to a gum build-up
(Dempsey 2008, pg. 167).
• Lubricant starvation (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 335).
• Misalignment (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 335).
• Insufficient clearance between the stem and guide (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg.
335).
Valve seizure can result in a piston strike and severe secondary damage to the engine.
Valve stem and guide wear
Dempsey (2008, pg. 165) discusses the side-loading of valves from the rocker assembly,
causing the valve guide to wear an eccentric shape at the top and bottom of the valve
guide. The wear at the top encourages oil to leak down into the exhaust port, while the
wear at the bottom invites carbon build-up, which causes premature valve stem wear
and scoring.
Fretting corrosion may occur at the valve stem keepers and initiate fatigue cracking,
causing a valve to drop into the combustion chamber (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 337).
Sulfurous by-products from combustion contribute to valve wear (Greuter & Zima 2012,
pg. 339).
Valve spring failure modes
Valve springs fail due to fatigue cracking that may be initiated by very minor surface
flaws or material inclusions. Additionally, failure may occur at the interface between
the spring end and the cylinder head due to fretting corrosion initiating fatigue cracking
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 325).
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Dempsey (2008, pg. 170-171) advises that due to the minor nature of defects required to
produce the severe consequences of the engine ‘swallowing a valve’ (the valve dropping
into the combustion chamber), valve springs should be replaced at each overhaul no
matter what assessment the technician has made of their condition.
Corrosion and hot corrosion
General corrosion is primarily driven by sulfurous combustion by-products dropping
below their dew point and forming acids. The following conditions contribute to general
corrosion:
• Low quality, high sulfur fuel
• Low acid neutralisation capacity in the lubricating oil
• Continuous low running temperatures, allowing condensation of sulfurous by-
products
• Excessive blow-by
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 339)
More specifically, Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 316-317) advise that valve guides are
prone to corrosive attack. If sulfurous by-products and any moisture in the exhaust
gases are deposited in the valve guide, premature material removal will occur. Fac-
tors contributing to this are low quality, high sulfur fuel, and incorrect dimensions or
clearance at the valve stem and valve guide interface.
Hot corrosion involves heavy metal-oxide by-products (Sulfur, Vanadium and Sodium)
that react to form low melting point salts. The salts deposit on the high temperature
exhaust valves, producing the following effects:
• The protective passivating metal oxide layers on the valve are dissolved by the
salts.
• Alloying elements are drawn out of the valve material.
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• Oxygen is harboured by the salts in contact with the valve, increasing the corro-
sion rate.
• The salts deposit unevenly on the valve sealing surface allowing leakage. This
leakage develops localised heating and eventually burnt valves.
To counteract the problem, leaner fuel mixes can be used, or design changes to the
valve and valve cooling can be made (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 340-341).
2.8.6 Pistons
The primary functions of the engine piston are to provide the bottom surface of the com-
bustion chamber, and to transmit power to and from the combustion gasses (Greuter
& Zima 2012, pg. 99-100).
Piston seizure
Piston seizure can be caused by the following conditions:
• Uneven head torque warping the cylinder, which leads to piston contact (Greuter
& Zima 2012, pg. 115).
• Overheating due to cooling defects or combustion chamber abnormalities causes
expansion of the piston, eliminating the lubrication clearance.
• Excessively smooth cylinder bore that does not have appropriate hone marks.
• Broken piston rings.
• Lubrication system failure.
• Oil dilution by fuel causing oil starvation.
• Fuel flooding, washing the lubricant from the cylinder bore.
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 115-135)
Dempsey (2008, pg. 219-221) writes that seizure is caused by lubricant starvation,
contamination, overheating, harsh combustion and poor assembly quality.
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Wear
Piston wear is predominantly caused by:
• Dirt ingress, through the lubricating system, fuel system or combustion air sys-
tem.
• Poor manufacturing techniques.
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 125-126) (Dempsey 2008, pg. 219)
Piston burn-through and melting
Piston burn-through, or holing, can occur due to poor fuel injection and overheating
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 144-150). Dempsey (2008, 219) supports this, advising
that rough combustion (referred to as detonation damage) erodes the piston leading to
holing.
Piston head deformation
Deformation can be caused by contact with the cylinder valves, due to incorrect timing,
incorrect clearance, broken valve springs, or valve seizure (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg.
151-154).
Piston cracking
Cracking of the piston, ring land, wrist pin and the associated wrist pin bore, retainer
and boss can be caused by:
• Fatigue cracking.
• Harsh combustion and overloading caused by:
– Poor fuel injection
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– Incorrect fuel to air ratios, which can be caused by clogged air filters or
leaks.
– Engine cooling problems
– Excessive use of starting aids
• Overheating.
• Poor quality assembly or casting defects.
• Excessive piston-cylinder wall clearance. This causes the piston rings to sit out
further, increasing the stress on the ring groove. Additionally, it emphasises the
contact between the cylinder wall and the piston skirt.
• Water accumulation while the engine is shut down, causing hydraulic lock.
• Piston head and wrist pin bore, caused by high-temperature mechanical fatigue.
• Sealing ring grooves, caused by high clearance between the clyinder wall and
piston (supporting Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 137-142) Dempsey (2008, pg.
221)).
• Piston skirt, also caused by high clearance, which emphasises contact between
the cylinder and bottom of the skirt.
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 137-142, 164-176) (Dempsey 2008, pg. 221) (Silva 2006)
Unterweiser, F.R., Hutchings, P.M. (1981) Martin (2004)
Unterweiser, F.R., Hutchings, P.M. (1981) presents the case of a wrist pin failure due
to fatigue cracking, which initiated in a non-metallic inclusion.
Piston ring failure
Piston rings can experience the following failure modes:
• Fracture due to:
– Harsh combustion.
– Insufficient clearance once fitted to the piston/cylinder.
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– While fitting the rings to the piston, they must be opened up. If this is done
incorrectly, it can directly lead to fracture.
• Preload loss, reducing the sealing effectiveness.
• Wear, for the same reasons that cylinder liners and pistons suffer wear.
• Burned rings, due to piston overheating, which compromises lubrication.
• Stuck rings, due to piston overheating that has burnt the lubricating oil. The
residue causes the rings to become stuck and they can no longer perform their
sealing function.
Wrist pin liberation
If the retaining ring is damaged, the wrist pin may be able to float free and contact
the cylinder wall, leading to catastrophic damage. This can occur due to poor fitment,
bent connecting rod or crankshaft and excessive crankshaft end float (Dempsey 2008,
pg. 221).
2.8.7 Connecting Rods
Diesel engine connecting rods transfer the linear power developed in the combustion
chamber to the rotating crankshaft; their reliability is of critical importance to engine
safety and failures are often catastrophic. Thus, they are conservatively designed and
are constructed from a forged medium alloy steel (GE Transportation 2012a, sec. 10,
pg. 5)(Dempsey 2008, pg. 226).
Fatigue cracking
Connecting rods are susceptible to fatigue cracking in the bearing housings and body
(Dempsey 2008, pg. 231-233). This is supported by Rabb (1996) in an analysis of a
failed connecting rod.
Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 197-202) provide examples of fatigue cracking initiating
from:
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• Manufacturing and maintenance damage, including small nicks, grind marks and
other slight damage.
• Fretting corrosion between the bearing and bearing housing, due to low bolt
pretension or incorrect dimensions.
• Opening of the bearing mating faces and subsequent bolt failure due to low pre-
tension.
Bent connecting rod
Dempsey (2008, pg. 229-230) advises that a bent connecting rod will cause overloading
in the connecting rod bearings and abnormal wear patterns on the piston skirt. Greuter
& Zima (2012, pg. 202-203) advises that bent connecting rods are primarily due to
secondary damage, resulting from piston seizure or hydraulic lock that is caused by
coolant, oil or fuel leaking into the cylinder.
2.8.8 Bearings
The function of the wrist pin and crankshaft journal bearing set is to:
• Transfer heat.
• Wash away wear particles.
• Reduce friction.
• Separate metal surfaces.
• Transfer force.
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 215, 221-222)
Crankshaft journal and wrist pin bearings are of the plain bearing type, because they
are able to be heavily loaded, operate at high speeds, have a long service life, are
suitable to be manufactured in two halves (for efficient assembly) and are relatively
simple to manufacture (Mollenhauer & Tschke 2010, pg. 259).
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Contamination, Wear and Erosion
Mollenhauer & Tschke (2010, pg. 269) advises that low rates of wear are normal and
do not cause harm. However, if the lubricating barrier is compromised, abrasive wear
can occur. Small particles can cause accelerated laminar wear and large particles can
cause more serious scoring. If the wear rate increases and the operating temperature
rises, adhesive wear becomes a risk, leading to total bearing failure.
Sources of wear particles can include:
• Particles liberated by cavitation
• Dirt and other foreign material
• Manufacture by-products, including sand, weld splatter and machining chips
• Engine operation by-products that have entered the lubricating oil
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 233-240,249)
Cavitation
The cavitation mechanism is described in section 2.8.1. Bearing cavitation is caused
by oil flow characteristics that cause the lubricant pressure to drop below the vapour
pressure. Material liberated by cavitation causes wear and scoring to occur downstream
of the cavitation area. Bearing cavitation can be aided by oil dilution and high bearing
temperatures (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 243-249).
Fatigue
Fatigue damage occurs due to the cyclical loading inherent in the engine process; Mol-
lenhauer & Tschke (2010, pg. 270) and Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 240) agree that
the loading pressure gradient has a greater affect than the load pressure magnitude.
Greuter & Zima (2012, 241-242) advise that cracking will propagate in an axial direc-
tion until it reaches the steel backing and then will propagate along the circumference
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until a chunk of bearing liner material falls out. At each stage in the crack propagation,
the lubricating function is reduced, leading to bearing failure.
Corrosion
Mollenhauer & Tschke (2010, pg. 269) write that corrosion generally occurs due to a
lubricating oil system fault; this will not be explored any further, as the project has
not covered the lubricating oil system.
Electrical Discharge
Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 251-253) write that electrical discharge can be caused by
welding and external voltage sources or inductive current from a generator. The arcing
causes small areas to melt, which are subsequently washed out, leaving craters in the
bearing material and reducing the lubricating function.
Assembly Defects
Assembly defects can include:
• Incorrect connecting rod bolt torque can cause bearing ovality in the vertical
direction due to insufficient torque or ovality in the horizontal direction due to
excessive torque, reducing the bearing’s ability to develop a full oil film.
• Installation errors, including covered oil passages, locating lug and pin seating
errors.
• Foreign material inclusions between the bearing and connecting rod bore, leading
to fretting corrosion and fatigue cracking.
(Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 258, 269-274)
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2.8.9 Turbocharger
The turbocharger uses waste energy from the exhaust gasses to compress the charge
air, increasing the engine capacity and efficiency (GE Transportation 2012a, section 16,
pg. 4) (Greuter & Zima 2012, pg. 477). Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 484-496) identify
the following turbocharger failure modes:
Manufacture defects Manufacture defects include material inclusions leading to fa-
tigue fracture.
Impact damage Items that are either left in the ducting or come loose following
maintenance cause damage to the turbine and compressor.
Imbalance Due to the high rotational speeds, relatively small imbalances caused by
uneven rotor deposits, uneven wear and faulty bearings can cause failure.
Erosion Erosion occurs if the exhaust gasses contain particles.
Fatigue cracking Fatigue cracking can be initiated by corrosion, foreign object im-
pact, imbalance and high cycle fatigue (HCF) caused by self-induced vibration.
Lubrication failure Lubrication failure can be caused by lubricant contamination,
oil starvation or over-aged oil.
Oil leakage Oil leakage can occur due to worn seals, excessive oil level or obstructed
oil drain lines.
2.8.10 Intercooler
The intercooler function is to increase air density by cooling the hot, pressurised air
discharged by the turbocharger (GE Transportation 2012a, section 8, pg. 17).
Greuter & Zima (2012, pg. 463-477) identify the following failure modes that can affect
heat exchangers:
Corrosion Corrosion can be caused by poor coolant quality or contaminant ingress.
Fouling Fouling is the deposition of a layer of low thermally conductive material,
originating in the coolant or due to a chemical reaction or biological growth.
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Fatigue and fretting corrosion Vibration, thermal expansion and contraction and
pressure shocks can cause fretting corrosion and fatigue in the heat exchanger.
Blockages Contaminants can reduce heat exchanger efficiency by clogging flow paths.
Cavitation Localised low pressure areas as a result of undesirable flow paths can result
in cavitation.
2.9 Applicable Australian Standards and Regulations
• AS IEC 60300.3.11-2011 is the adopted Australian Standard for Reliability Cen-
tered Maintenance. It has been referenced heavily in this literature review.
• AS 4292.3-2006, the Australian Standard for Railway Safety Management of
Rolling Stock, the Rail Safety Act 2010 and the Rail Safety Regulations 2011
do not detail specific requirements for locomotive maintenance or diesel engine
maintenance. They generally address the need for adequate maintenance, the
ability to keep maintenance records, and a requirement that the Rail Safety Reg-
ulator must be notified 28 days prior to implementing a change to the maintenance
of rolling stock (Standards Australia 2006, pg. 15-16) (Rail Safety Act 2010, pg.
i-xi, 27) (Rail Safety Regulations 2011, pg. 198, 228, 233).
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2.10 Chapter Summary
In section 2.2, the literature reviewed has shown a distinct absence of academic liter-
ature detailing the formulation of maintenance tactics for locomotive engines working
in the heavy-haul mining industry, in a hot semi-arid climate. The asset operational
context is unique (refer to section 1.3), and the operating context has a significant
impact on the maintenance tactics that are applied (section 2.2 and 2.4.4). As a result,
the efficiency of RTIO’s current maintenance tactics (adopted directly from the OEM
standard recommendations, section 1.3) is not understood.
In section 2.3, the literature review has established that RCM is an effective method-
ology to evaluate and determine the appropriate maintenance tactics. Section 2.4.3
establishes that following the RCM process will develop a knowledge database of fail-
ure modes, effects and the risk that is mitigated by each maintenance task, fulfilling
the research aims and objectives identified in the project specification (appendix A)
and section 1.2). The project will pursue the application of the RCM methodology to
the RTIO locomotive engine in order to develop an understanding of the efficiency of
RTIO’s maintenance tactics, failure modes and the risk mitigated by each maintenance
task, contributing to the body of academic literature and knowledge in this area.
Seminal RCM publications, standards and academic research literature are reviewed in
section 2.5, informing the project of the best practice RCM methodology to be applied
to the project work. Most of these sources are clustered around the year 2000; the
author did not find any significant recent publications, indicating that the methodology
is mature and stable.
Section 2.5.1 identifies the knowledge required to perform an RCM analysis that did not
exist at the commencement of the project, requiring development in the early stages of
the project work. Each item is documented in chapter 3, but the key items of knowledge
that required development include:
• Evaluation and prioritisation of the engine subsystems according to HSE risk,
maintenance costs, corrective maintenance and production delays.
• Definition of the operational context.
• Reliability modelling and analysis of equipment failure modes.
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– In order to inform the project on best practice reliability modelling, literature
on the topic of the Weibull distribution has been reviewed in section 2.7.
The literature reviewed found in section 2.5.1 that the RCM analysis participants must
be informed by a knowledge and understanding of:
• Equipment condition, failure modes and failure modes being prevented by the
current maintenance regime.
– To address this requirement, a literature review of common diesel engine
failure modes has been conducted by the author and included in section 2.8.
• Maintenance processes and novel maintenance techniques.
– The literature review of condition monitoring technologies for diesel engines
is included in section 2.6 to develop and demonstrate a sufficient knowledge
in this area.
• Access to, and understanding of, relevant legislation and regulations.
– A review of the relevant legislative and regulatory documents has been in-
cluded in section 2.9.
The literature review has gathered the foundational information to inform and support
the focus of the research, formulate the research methodology and develop the pre-
requisite knowledge to conduct the analysis.
Chapter 3
Reliability-Centered Maintenance
Analysis Planning and
Preparation
3.1 Chapter Overview
Chapter 3 provides a discussion on the planning phase of the RCM project. The
planning phase was carried out according to the guidelines established in chapter 2,
section 2.5.1 and includes the following tasks:
• Establish participant prior experience and knowledge (and develop or teach where
necessary).
• Establish the objectives of the RCM.
• Determine the analysis level and subsystems.
• Define the asset and system boundaries.
• Prioritise the subsystems.
• Define the operating context.
• Gather relevant legislation and regulations.
• Gather relevant operating procedures.
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3.2 Establish participant prior experience and knowledge
Due to resource constraints, the author was not able to assemble an RCM working
group, although this is recommended by the literature (Standards Australia 2011, pg.
17) (Moubray 2001, pg. 267). As a result, the author took the approach to develop the
framework of the analysis based on a literature review of failure modes, the author’s
own knowledge, ad-hoc consultation with senior tradesmen and a review of mainte-
nance work orders. Following this process, a formal Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) session was held with senior tradesmen to validate the analysis, cover any
undocumented failure modes, and expand in detail on the failure effects.
The author developed a short presentation providing an overview of RCM and an
FMEA worksheet (see appendix H) for the senior tradesmen who were involved in the
FMEA analysis. The author believes this provided the relevant context to ensure the
tradesmen were able to participate effectively.
The author developed the relevant RCM facilitator knowledge to carry out the RCM by
conducting the project literature review. To gain access to the appropriate experience,
the author consulted RCM experts within Rio Tinto.
In conclusion, the author believes that the approach was effective in this instance, and
every effort to consult the equipment maintainers was made, although conditions were
not ideal.
3.3 Establish Reliability-Centered Maintenance Analysis
Objectives
The research project aims and objectives are distinct from the business or industry
objectives; both facets of the project are detailed in this section in order to explicitly
identify the difference between research aims and industry outcomes. The primary
research aim is to determine whether RTIOs current maintenance regime is optimised
and identify the failure modes and the risk mitigated by each maintenance task (further
detail is provided in section 1.2). The primary business objectives and focus of this
RCM analysis is to:
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1. Reduce maintenance cost
2. Improve HSE performance and reduce risk
3. Improve equipment reliability
This will be achieved by:
• Eliminating unnecessary scheduled maintenance tasks.
• Refining the maintenance tasks that are undertaken.
• Recommending maintenance tasks that prevent failures and reduce corrective
maintenance cost.
• Reducing maintenance intervention; this reduces potential HSE incidents, as
maintenance tasks have the potential to contribute to a HSE incident.
• Identification of proactive maintenance tasks that will reduce HSE risk.
These objectives are driven by current business requirements; following the iron ore
boom and a return to a more sustainable, long-term iron ore price and demand, RTIO
is concerned with ‘production at the right cost’. However, this focus is still within the
context of a business that has ambitious production targets, requiring high equipment
reliability and an ongoing commitment to HSE excellence.
3.4 Analysis level and engine subsystems defined
The engine subsystem level has been chosen as the analysis level, to align with section
2.5.1 (Smith & Hinchcliffe 2003, pg. 75-76).
The following engine subsystems have been grouped according to GE Transportation
training manuals (GE Transportation 2012a). Where there are interfaces between sys-
tems (i.e. the turbocharger interfaces with the combustion and exhaust air systems
and the intercooler interfaces with the combustion air and cooling systems), the com-
ponent is grouped in the system if the component’s primary function supports the
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system’s function(s). For example, the turbocharger supports the combustion air sys-
tem’s function to supply combustion air at a specified pressure and flow rate, so it is
considered part of the combustion air system and not the exhaust system (Smith &
Hinchcliffe 2003, pg. 82-86).
Bottom End
The bottom end includes:
• The engine mainframe (block)
• Crankshaft
• Camshafts and drive/idler gear
• Crankshaft and camshaft bearings
• Engine oil pan
• Integrated front end cover
Fuel System
The Fuel System includes:
• Fuel tank
• Fuel lines
• Low pressure fuel transfer pump
• Fuel filter assembly
• High pressure fuel pump, line and injector
• Regulating valve
(The regulating valve provides back pressure in the return fuel lines.)
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Engine Sensors
The GEVO engine features more sensors than is reasonable to list. Some of the most
important sensors are:
• ECU - Engine Control Unit
• Engine fuel pressure sensor
• Crank speed sensors 1 and 2
• Fuel management sensor inputs, including:
– Manifold Air Pressure (MAP)
– Manifold Air Temperature (MAT)
– Barometric Pressure (BAP)
• Engine protection sensor inputs, including:
– Engine water inlet/outlet temperature (EWIT/EWOT)
– Engine oil inlet/outlet temperature (ELIT/ELOT)
– Ambient True Temperature (turbo inlet) (ATT)
– Pre-turbo right temperature (PTRT)
– Pre-turbo left temperature (PTLT)
– Engine water inlet/outlet pressure (EWIP/EWOP)
– Engine Oil inlet/outlet pressure (ELIP)
– Crankcase overpressure sensor (COP)
– Fuel supply pressure (EFP)
– Turbo speed sensor
Long Power Assembly
The Long Power Assembly includes:
• Cylinder head and strongback
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• Piston assembly and connecting rod
• Big end bearings
• Cylinder liner
• Valve train and pushrods
Lubricating Oil System
• Pre-Lubricating pump
• Lubricating oil pump
• Oil filters
• Oil cooler
• Oil pipes
Cooling System
• Water pump
• Water storage tank
• Radiators
• Radiator fans
• Water discharge manifold
Combustion Air
• V-screens
• Plastic air cleaner panels
• Baggy air filters
• Turbocharger
• Water-based intercooler
3.5 Subsystem prioritisation 74
• Air-based intercooler
• Air ducts
Exhaust Air
• Exhaust manifold
• Exhaust stack
3.5 Subsystem prioritisation
The performance of each engine subsystem has been assessed against the criteria set out
below, as recommended by Smith & Hinchcliffe (2003, pg. 77) and Standards Australia
(2011, pg. 15-16).
Extracts of the source data for this prioritisation analysis can be found in appendix B.
Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) is a vital measure of equipment per-
formance; RTIO’s license to operate requires adherence to HSE regulations.
Corrective maintenance has been divided into:
• PM02 events, which describe maintenance events that are able to be
planned and prepared for, but are not scheduled maintenance. Generally,
this describes two types of maintenance events:
– Potential failures that are detected while on the P-F curve; the equip-
ment has not yet failed but is showing signs of impending functional
failure. Condition-based maintenance activities are PM02 events.
– Fleet-wide modifications and upgrades.
• PM03 events, which are genuine break-down events, are reserved for func-
tional failures.
The two events are fundamentally different by definition and have a profoundly
different impact on the railway network; this is primarily determined by the
planned, prepared nature of the PM02 orders versus the unplanned, disruptive
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effect of PM03 events. For this reason, the PM03 event count has a greater impact
than the PM02 event count. As such, this analysis has treated the two categories
separately in addition to an analysis of total costs.
The first sample of raw corrective maintenance data collected contained approx-
imately 5000 entries. To process the raw data into useable data, the author used
a spreadsheet word search function to extract and categorise work orders. Any
work orders that were not sorted in this fashion were manually examined. Refer
to section B for example raw data.
Network Delay Data is a measure of the impact of failures on production and a
close equivalent to equipment downtime. Many failures translate to lost business
output, having a serious effect on the supply chain as a whole.
The network delay data includes a relatively large unknown category. This is due
to intermittent faults that are not easily resolved and difficulties collecting data
from the field.
The network delay data was sorted in the same manner as the corrective mainte-
nance data. Refer to section B for an example of raw data.
Primary maintenance (PM01) has not been considered in the analysis. PM01 main-
tenance is generally completed against a work order that is built at the locomotive
level, not the engine or engine system level. The effort required to determine the
costs and labour associated with each engine subsystem is considered unnecessary and
prohibitive.
3.5.1 Corrective Maintenance - PM02 Data
Power assemblies are the driver behind PM02 maintenance expenses, followed by the
combustion air system, forming the top two and top 80% of maintenance expenses
(refer to figure 3.1).
The event count reveals different drivers and a more even spread; the combustion air
system, oil system, fuel system, power assemblies and bottom end make up the top five
and 80% of events (figure 3.1). The event count does not conform neatly to the Pareto
Principle, but still provides an indication of where the best return on investment will
lie.
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Figure 3.1: Pareto of PM02 Count and Cost Data
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3.5.2 Corrective Maintenance - PM03 Data
Figure 3.2 shows that the power assemblies subsystem and the combustion air subsys-
tem clearly lead the cost of PM03 maintenance, followed by the Fuel system to make
up the top three subsystems and round out the top 80% of costs.
Figure 3.2 shows the event count, again revealing different drivers and a more even
spread. The oil system, power assemblies, fuel system, combustion air and sensor
systems make up the top five and 80% of events. As discussed earlier, the event count
of PM03 maintenance indicates a level of disruptiveness to the business, but is not
directly quantifiable.
3.5.3 Corrective Maintenance - Combined Costs
The combined costs of corrective maintenance include all PMO2 and PMO3 work order
data and is shown in figure 3.3. Power assemblies and combustion air systems are
clearly the most significant systems and make up the top 80% of the total corrective
maintenance spend.
3.5.4 Network Delay Data
The network delay data displays a reasonably even spread in figure 3.4. Sensors, fuel
system, unknown, cooling system and combustion air system make up the top 80% of
the delay duration. In the delay count, the order is slightly different, but the same
subsystems are included in the top 80% here as well, indicating correlation between
delay count and total duration of network delay.
3.5.5 Health, Safety and Environmental Incident Data
The worst performers in terms of HSE are the oil system, fuel system, power assemblies
and combustion air systems (refer to figure 3.5). It should be noted that the majority
of oil system environmental incidents are due to a design flaw - victaulic pipe couplings
have been used to connect lubricating oil pipe work, which then suffers cracking, causing
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Figure 3.2: Pareto of PM03 Count and Cost Data
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Figure 3.3: Pareto of Combined Cost Data
oil leaks. This component is being redesigned as a flexible pipe, which is expected to
solve the problem.
The oil and fuel subsystems both have a maximum incident severity rating of two, or
‘medium’, as seen in figure 3.5. In particular, the fuel subsystem has two incidents
rated as ‘medium’.
3.5.6 Subsystem Prioritisation Summary
The subsystems are analysed in the following order:
1. The fuel subsystem will be analysed first, for two reasons:
• It is one of the smaller systems and is expected to provide good analysis
material for a ‘trial run’ of the RCM process.
• It is in the top two for RDAS delay data and HSE delay data, and in the
top three for PM03 data.
2. The Power Assemblies subsystem incurs the greatest costs in both PM02 and
PM03 work orders. As stated in section 3.3, cost reduction is a primary objective
of this project. Additionally, the Power Assemblies have caused HSE incidents.
3. The Combustion Air subsystem incurs the second greatest maintenance costs, is
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Figure 3.4: Pareto of Network Delay Duration Data
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Figure 3.5: Health, Safety and Environmental Incident Severity Rating Data, including
maximum severity rating (top), a pareto chart of the sum of the severity ratings (middle)
and a pareto chart of the incident count (bottom)
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fourth worst for HSE incidents, and is included in the top 80% for network delay
duration; it will be prioritised as the third subsystem to be studied.
3.6 Operating Context
The operating context statement has been developed according to the method presented
by Moubray (2001, pg. 28-35) and Standards Australia (2011, pg. 17-18).
Business and economic context. RTIO is currently expanding iron ore production,
with ambitious production targets and an optimised, balanced supply chain. Iron
ore prices have been high for a number of years but appear to be returning to
more sustainable, long-term levels. As such, the business is placing focus on
production cost efficiency.
The market demand for iron ore is high; all product can be sold and any lost
production time at critical system bottlenecks (e.g. ore car dumpers, ship load-
ers) directly translates to lost revenue. Delays are estimated by RTIO Business
Analysts to incur a cost of $50/minute in most locations (McArthur, J 2014, pers.
comm. 6 March).
Iron ore supply to the rail system from the mine is generally consistent. Rail
has been considered to be the supply chain bottleneck, because ore supply from
the mines generally exceeds the rail capacity. However, the bottleneck location
tends to move depending on a number of factors, indicating that the network is
optimised and balanced.
The Rail division operates a fleet of 182 locomotives, of which 106 are the EVO
model. At any one time, the maintenance department has an allowance for twelve
locomotives out of service for maintenance. It is often logistically difficult to
remove a locomotive from service for maintenance.
HSE standards. RTIO operates with a ‘zero harm’ culture, and no HSE incidents are
acceptable. The railway easement passes through national parks and adjacent to
culturally sensitive Aboriginal sites, adding an extra layer of responsibility to
environmental standards.
Climate. The locomotives are operated in the Pilbara region of Western Australia,
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which is known for long summers that deliver periods of intense heat, approaching
50 degrees Celsius. There is little rain, except during cyclonic events.
Operation. The trip from the port to the mine and back to port averages approxi-
mately 38 hours and the locomotive will cover between 540 and 860 kilometres
depending on the mine location. The locomotive is available for service 24 hours
a day, but the asset is not utilised continuously. Precise asset utilisation data is
not available.
Performance. The Evolution engine is designed to produce 3,300kW of mechanical
power, and is operated at this level for a number of hours at a time. The scheduled
engine life is 33,750MWhrs (approximately 8 years).
Redundancy. The locomotives are usually operated in consists of three, though only
two are required for most journeys. A number of mines require up to two ‘banker’
locomotives to increase tractive effort, and power, while climbing the relatively
steep gradients away from the mine. Operating the locomotives in a triple consist
reduces the stress on each locomotive and adds redundancy as two locomotives
are sufficient to complete most journeys.
‘Rescue’ locomotives can be sent to recover a failed train, but this is a disrup-
tive action that incurs long network delays. A failed train due to a locomotive
shutdown can cause delays of four hours to the network.
Batch or flow process. The rail network is technically a batch process, as each train
is a batch of ore and if there is a fault, the train can usually be placed on a siding
to keep the mainline clear and operational. However, if a crippling failure occurs
on single track, the process begins to behave in a flow manner, as the entire
network may be blocked.
Acceptable failure rate. The maintenance department produces equipment avail-
ability and reliability, and the quality of this is primarily measured by the ‘suc-
cessful journey’ count. A locomotive is considered to have failed the journey if
a fault causes a delay to the rail network. The currently accepted proportion of
successful journeys is 95%, so the acceptable failure rate is 1 in 20 for a triple set
of locomotives. This may be translated to a failure rate of 1 in 60 trips for each
locomotive.
Time to repair and spare part availability. Time to repair is dependent upon lo-
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cation. A maintenance technician is located inland at the mines to provide sup-
port and can repair a number of locomotive failures, or diagnose the failure so
that the workshop can prepare for the repair work ahead of time. Once a loco-
motive has returned to the workshop, repair time is generally minimal (unless it
is a catastrophic failure) as the workshop facility is well equipped with tools and
a number of expert troubleshooting maintenance technicians.
Spare part availability is generally good. If a critical spare is not available, it can
be transported from Perth (1600km) within three days at a considerable cost, or
within one week at normal freight prices.
3.7 Regulations and Legislation
Section 2.9 established that there are no regulations or legislation specific to engine
maintenance in Australia.
3.8 Operating Procedures
Operating procedures are not relevant, as the engine is not operated directly, but is
controlled by the Engine Control Unit.
3.9 System Boundary Definitions
The subsystem boundary definition follows the template set out in Smith & Hinchcliffe
(2003, pg. 85-86). The boundary definition for the fuel system, power assembly system
and combustion air system is provided in appendix C.
3.10 Fuel system preparatory information and data
Fuel system-specific preparatory data has been gathered as recommended in section
2.5.1 and by Netherton (2002), Rausand (1998), and Standards Australia (2011, pg.
18). The data includes:
3.10 Fuel system preparatory information and data 85
• Reliability Analysis
• Safety, incident and accident failure reports
• System BOMs, schematics and technical drawings
• Existing maintenance schedules
• Spare parts usage rates
3.10.1 Reliability Analysis
The three major items in the fuel system are the fuel transfer pump, High Pressure
(HP) fuel pumps and HP fuel injectors, and the service life data of each of these items
has been modelled.
High Pressure Fuel Pumps
The HP fuel pumps were modelled as a set consisting of the twelve pumps. The author
believed this to be the best method because:
• During primary maintenance, HP fuel pumps are replaced as a set.
• When a locomotive experiences a failed pump, only one component is replaced,
but the component position identification is not always recorded, so it is not
possible to track failure data for each individual component.
Section 2.7 states that a Weibull plot should be performed on one failure mode only
(Abernethy 2006, pg. 1.4). The author investigated each failure to determine the failure
mode; however, due to limited detail in the failure data, this is not possible. Where the
failure mode was able to be discerned, manufacturing faults that have been corrected
were excluded; all other failure modes were included, treating the unit as a black box.
The interpretation of the results must bear in mind the limitations in the data.
The pumps can be modelled as a pump-set and, when failures occur, the repair of the
set is treated ‘as good as old’, because only one of the twelve pumps has been replaced
(refer to section 2.7) (Meridium 2012).
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For an extract of the source data used to model the HP fuel pumps and injectors, refer
to figures G.1 and G.2.
A review of maintenance records revealed the following information about HP pump
failure modes:
• 3 Due to guide pin falling out (a manufacture defect that has been eliminated)
• 1 Corroded (no further detail available)
• 1 Solenoid not engaging
• 1 Leaking
• 4 Unknown
The author notes that it is unlikely that the 4 unknown failures were due to the man-
ufacturing defect as there was no evidence of components replaced due to secondary
damage. When the guide pin falls out, the cam section is damaged.
Referring to figure 3.6, the results indicate that the HP fuel pump generally displays
a wear-out failure mode (β = 3.42). Thus the data indicates that extending the pump
service life will increase the failure rate.
High Pressure Fuel Injectors
The HP Injectors are modelled as a set of twelve, as described for the HP Pumps in
section 3.10.1.
No significant detail could be found on the injector failure modes; as described for the
HP pumps in section 3.10.1, the injector is modelled as a black box unit.
Referring to figure 3.7, the injectors appear to be most unreliable early in life and their
reliability increases with time.
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Figure 3.6: High Pressure Pump Weibull Plot
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Figure 3.7: High Pressure Injector Weibull Plot
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Figure 3.8: Fuel Transfer Pump Modelling Plot
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Figure 3.9: Fuel Transfer Pump Modelling - Service Life Optimisation
Fuel Transfer Pump
Referring to figure 3.8, it can be seen that the transfer pump is not modelled by the
Weibull distribution but the Normal distribution. The fuel transfer pump is currently
experiencing failures due to a design flaw that the OEM is taking action to rectify.
An optimisation using RTRS was performed and is displayed in figure 3.9; the optimum
replacement period is calculated to be 4.68 years, which most closely aligns with the
half engine life of approximately 4 years.
3.10.2 Component performance analysis
High Pressure fuel pumps and injectors are identified in the RCM analysis as items that
are best maintained by scheduled restoration. To aid evaluation of the correct interval
for maintenance, teardown inspections have been carried out on the injectors; HP fuel
pumps have not been assessed due to limited availability of spare parts in the rotable
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Figure 3.10: Fuel system injector performance assessment results summary
Figure 3.11: Fuel system injector performance assessment results
pool at the time of writing.
The author was unable to locate an Australian Standard to define the test methods; the
standard tests conducted by a reputable diesel injection repair workshop were accepted.
Injector Teardown Analysis and Performance Assessment
A full set of 12 fuel injectors were sent to United Fuel Injection for performance assess-
ment. The results were disappointing; the injector performance was much worse than
expected, even for end-of-life.
The key points were noted by the diesel injection workshop:
• 11 of the 12 injectors did not create an acceptable atomised spray pattern. Refer
to figure 3.11 for recorded results. Refer to figure 3.12 for an example of a poor
injector and the best injector, respectively.
• All injectors suffered excessive back-leakage (refer to figures 3.10 and 3.11).
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Figure 3.12: Disassembled injectors (top left), injector displaying blocked nozzles (top
right), injector displaying streams of unatomised diesel (bottom left) and a properly per-
forming injector (bottom right)
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• The cracking (injector opening) pressures were low, some by as much as 54 bar
(refer to figure 3.11).
• A number of nozzles were blocked (refer to figures 3.10 and 3.12).
• A number of injector seats were leaking (figure 3.10).
These results indicate that a life extension on the injectors is not possible at this
time; a defect elimination project will be required to determine the root cause of poor
injector performance, eliminate the root cause and ensure that the injectors are fit to
be operated for the standard service life.
3.10.3 Safety, incident and accident failure reports
Figures E.1 and E.2 in appendix E provide the relevant examples from the RTIO HSE
incident recording system. The fuel system incidents are due to bolts that are left loose
following maintenance.
3.10.4 System Bill Of Materials (BOM), technical manuals, schemat-
ics and assembly drawings
It is not practical to include the entire technical assembly drawings and BOM, but an
extract has been included in appendix D.
A system schematic is included in figure 3.13 and a representation of the HP fuel pump
is included in figure 3.14.
3.10.5 Existing maintenance program
Scheduled maintenance tasks are currently applied as shown in table 3.1.
3.10.6 Spare parts usage rates
A summary of parts usage rates is provided in table 3.2. Further details are provided in
appendix F, including a breakdown by monthly usage and scheduled versus unscheduled
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Figure 3.13: Fuel System Schematic (GE Transportation 2012a, sec. 5 pg. 4)
Table 3.1: Scheduled maintenance applied to fuel system components
Item Scheduled Interval
Fuel Transfer Pump replacement 11,000 MWHrs
High Pressure Fuel Pump replacement 11,000 MWHrs
Fuel Injectors replacement 7,000 MWHrs
Fuel Strainer and Seal replacement 4 Monthly
Fuel Filters and Seal replacement 4 Monthly
Dead Cylinder Test 4 Monthly
General inspection for leaks and rubs Daily and 4 Monthly
Low pressure fuel pressure inspection 4 Monthly
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Figure 3.14: Fuel System HP Pump (GE Transportation 2012a, sec. 7 pg. 3)
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Table 3.2: Total fuel system component consumption, January 2013 to March 2014 - *
indicates an estimate, as the item is supplied as part of a service kit, not individually
Item Total Component Usage
Fuel Transfer Pump 26
High Pressure Fuel Pump 207
Fuel Injectors 642
Fuel Strainer* 302
Fuel Filters* 309
Fuel Regulating Cartridge Nil
High Pressure Fuel Line 1
usage.
3.11 Power assembly preparatory information and data
The same preparatory data and information has been compiled for the power assembly
as for the fuel system (above). For reference, the outline of this data is included at the
beginning of section 3.10.
3.11.1 Reliability Analysis
Maintenance records indicate that the Evolution locomotives have experienced cracked
pushrods five times. Similar to the HP fuel pumps and injectors (reference section
3.10), the pushrods were modelled as a system of 24 components that are repaired ‘as
good as old’. Figure 3.15 shows that this is a random failure mode (β ≈ 1).
The author was not able to find any other failure modes in the maintenance records
that had enough failure data points recorded or warranted investigation. A piston
design issue resulted in a large number of premature failures, but it is not considered
beneficial to model this data as it is a known design issue that has been eliminated.
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Figure 3.15: Snapped Pushrod Modelling Plot
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Table 3.3: Scheduled maintenance items applied to power assembly system components
Maintenance Item Scheduled Interval
Valve lash inspection and adjustment 12 Monthly
Crosshead and camshaft inspection 12 Monthly
Power assembly overhaul Engine life - 33,750 MWHrs
3.11.2 Safety, incident and accident failure reports
The power assemblies caused three incidents that were logged in the HSE incident
system; each was related to the known piston design issue resulting in a minor oil
and/or coolant spill and ranked as a ‘low’ Maximum Reasonable Outcome (MRO).
The power assemblies are not considered to pose a significant risk to safety or the
environment.
3.11.3 System Bill Of Materials (BOM), technical manuals, schemat-
ics and assembly drawings
It is not practical to include the entire technical assembly drawings and BOM, but
an extract of the power assembly system drawing showing the primary components is
included in figure 3.16. Figure D.4 contains the item number component descriptions.
3.11.4 Existing maintenance program
Scheduled maintenance tasks are currently applied as shown in table 3.3. All compo-
nents are designed to run engine life with only minor inspection or adjustment.
3.11.5 Spare parts usage rates
A summary of parts usage rates is provided in appendix F, including a breakdown by
monthly usage. All power assembly component usage is unscheduled.
Most items appear to have quite low usage rates; however, four items appear to have
excessive consumption. These are displayed in table 3.4.
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Figure 3.16: Renewal Parts Catalogue Part A - Partial Power Assembly System Bill Of
Materials (GE Transportation 2014)
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Table 3.4: Total Power Assembly component consumption, January 2013 to March 2014
Item Total Component Usage
1. SEAL,O-RING;GE 41A219499ABP246 65
2. POWER ASSY;UPPER;322X1007 23
3. GASKET;STRONG BACK TO TOPDECK,315X1000-2 22
4. RING KIT;PISTON;350X1005 16
A review of the work orders accompanying the component usage reveals the following;
• Item 1 was largely due to a manufacturer field modification for a separate issue.
• Items 2, 3 and 4 are often replaced together and are mostly accounted for by the
piston design issue.
Thus, accounting for special causes, a review of the component usage does not highlight
any current or potential reliability problems.
3.12 Combustion Air System preparatory information and
data
3.12.1 Reliability Analysis
During a review of the maintenance history, the author found that the air-to-air in-
tercooler inlet flange had caused a number of failures as a result of fatigue cracking.
When the service life data was modelled on the Weibull distribution (3.17), the data
indicated that the failure mode had a beta value of 2, indicating increasing probability
of failure with age.
3.12.2 Safety, incident and accident failure reports
The combustion air system has been responsible for one incident: a turbocharger failure
allowed hot pieces of debris to enter the air filter compartment, setting the air filters
on fire. The locomotive driver was able to put the fire out with a fire extinguisher.
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Figure 3.17: Air-to-Air inlet flange fatigue cracking modelled on the Weibull distribution
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Figure 3.18: Combustion air system schematic
The incident was rated as having low severity due to the small size of the fire and
limited amount of combustible material available. As such, the author concludes that
the combustion air system is unlikely to cause accidents that have health, safety or
environmental ramifications.
3.12.3 System Bill Of Materials (BOM), technical manuals, schemat-
ics and assembly drawings
A schematic of the combustion air system major components and air flow is included
in figure 3.18.
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Table 3.5: Scheduled maintenance applied to combustion air system components
Item Scheduled Interval
Turbocharger Overhaul at 33,750MWHrs
Water based intercooler Overhaul at 33,750MWHrs
Air based intercooler No current strategy - OEM recommendation: replace at 33,750MWHrs
Air based intercooler fans No current strategy - OEM recommendation: replace at 12 years
Spin filters Wash every 12 months
Baggy air filters Replace every 4 months
3.12.4 Existing maintenance program
The scheduled maintenance currently applied to the combustion air system components
is included in table 3.5.
3.12.5 Spare parts usage rates
A breakdown of total spare parts consumption rates is included in appendix F, figure
F.5. A number of items had a very high rate of usage; each of these were investigated
and the findings displayed in figure F.6. Generally the usage was accounted for by
large component failures due to manufacturing defects or design flaws, except for the
following items that will require further investigation during the analysis:
• O-RING; GE 41A219499ABP374
– This O-ring is located on the Turbocharger discharge duct. It fails often,
but with little consequence. Further details are available in section 6.2.9.
• FLANGE; 8.5”; HEAT EXCH; 84B518058AGP1
– This flange suffers failure due to fatigue cracking; further discussion is pro-
vided in section 6.2.10.
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3.13 Chapter Summary
This chapter has established the following:
• The required resources and knowledge to complete the RCM.
• The research aims are to understand the maintenance program efficiency; the
business objectives are to reduce cost, reduce risk and improve reliability.
• The major engine systems for analysis have been defined and prioritised. The
whole engine cannot be analysed due to time constraints, so the systems to be
analysed are:
1. Fuel system
2. Power Assemblies system
3. Combustion Air system
• The operating context has been defined.
• Preparatory data specific to each subsystem has been collated and presented.
Chapter 4
Reliability-Centered Maintenance
Analysis Process
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the RCM analysis process as undertaken during the project.
The analysis has been developed and recorded in the Rio Tinto Reliability Solution
(RTRS). RTRS is based on software commercially available from Meridium Inc. The
structure of the software is slightly different to the seven questions asked by the RCM
process (Moubray 2001, 16-21); however, all of the required criteria are met to answer
these questions in compliance with the JA1011 standard set forth by the Society of
Automotive Engineers (2009). It is compliant with the SAE RCM standard JA1011
(Society of Automotive Engineers 2009) (Meridium 2014).
Screen shots from each stage of the RCM software are provided in appendix I.
The fuel system analysis is discussed to provide the reader with an example.
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4.2 Reliability-Centered Maintenance Analysis Process
4.2.1 Fuel System Functions
Following a review of the General Electric Transportation Systems (GETS) training
material for the EVO engine and diesel engine theory textbooks (including Mollenhauer
& Tschke (2010), Dempsey (2008) and Greuter & Zima (2012)), four functions were
identified in the fuel system and defined according to the literature review in section
2.5.3.
Each of the functions and their respective performance parameters are recorded in the
’Function’ form in RTRS. For a screenshot of the function data form, refer to figure
I.1.
Fuel System 1. Low Pressure (LP) circuit to contain and provide clean,
pressurised fuel to the twelve high pressure fuel pumps.
This function is a primary and evident function.
GE Transportation (2012a, sec. 5, pg. 3-7) specifies the following performance param-
eters:
• The fuel filters must remove any particles greater than 5 micron in diameter
to prevent damage to the HP pumps and injectors that have small component
clearances.
• The target supply pressure is 620kPa at low idle; this reduces to 420kPa at
maximum engine power production (3310 kW at 1050 rpm, Notch 8).
• The supply pressure must not exceed 896kPa.
• The fuel is supplied at a rate of 48L/min and excess fuel is returned to the tank
via the low pressure fuel return line and the high pressure leak-off line.
• The fuel temperature is to be between 17 and 49 degrees Celsius.
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Fuel System 2. HP fuel pumps to provide pressurised, timed, metered fuel
to the injectors.
This function is a primary and evident function.
The HP pump is naturally responsible for providing pressurised fuel to the injectors,
but they are also tasked with timing the fuel delivery and metering the amount of
fuel that is delivered. This is accomplished using a solenoid that is controlled by the
Electronic Control Unit (ECU) (refer to figure 3.14).
The following performance parameters are identified:
• Maximum injection pressure: 1800 bar.
• Notch 8 Injection timing: 5 degrees Before Top Dead Centre (BTDC).
(GE Transportation 2012a, sec. 7 pg. 2-5)
Fuel System 3. HP fuel injectors to supply the metered fuel to the cylinder
in the designed spray pattern, in an atomised state.
This function is a primary and evident function.
The EVO engine spray pattern details are not available, so the author has referenced to
general injector theory. A diesel injector must atomise the diesel to facilitate complete
combustion (Mollenhauer & Tschke 2010, pg. 64). The function statement implies
that leakage and cylinder wall contact is unacceptable, as leaked fuel is not in an
atomised state and cylinder wall contact is not part of the designed injector spray
pattern (Dempsey 2008, pg. 78).
The only performance parameter identified is that injector needle lift is designed to
occur at 450 bar (GE Transportation 2012a, sec. 7 pg. 5).
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Fuel System 4. HP fuel to bleed off past pump internal seals, lubricate HP
components and drain back to the fuel tank.
Lubrication of HP fuel system components is an evident, secondary function that is
critical to system operation.
4.2.2 Functional Failures
The functional failures of the fuel system are defined according to section 2.5.4. An
example of the entry form is included in figure I.2. To provide an example, function 2
of the fuel system (described above) can fail in the following ways:
1. Complete HP fuel pump failure - supplies no fuel.
2. Partial failure of HP fuel pump, delivers fuel but does not time or meter fuel
appropriately, or supplies fuel below required pressure.
3. Fails to contain fuel.
4.2.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
In order to develop the FMEA portion of the RCM analysis as described in sections
2.5.5 and 2.5.6, four primary sources of information were consulted:
• Maintenance records
• Engine maintenance and failure analysis textbooks
• Academic failure analysis papers
• Senior locomotive maintainers
Each of the resources listed above have proved invaluable. A review of the maintenance
records allowed the author to glean basic information on common failures seen in the
RTIO fleet. A literature review on engine maintenance and failure analysis allowed the
author to identify failure modes that have not been witnessed in the RTIO locomotive
fleet but are likely to occur if no maintenance were to be performed.
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Once the appropriate base level of knowledge was established and the framework for the
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was constructed, an FMEA session was
held with senior locomotive maintainers to capture first-hand details and knowledge of
RTIO’s operation.
The FMEA entry forms are provided in figures I.3, I.4 and I.5.
A relevant example of a failure mode and its effect is:
• 02.01.01 High pressure pump seizes
– Failure mode details:
The HP Pump seizes due to wear, cavitation or corrosion over an extended
period of time in service, leading to fatigue cracking, material liberation.
This gives rise to galling, scuffing and cracking which once initiated, quickly
causes the pump to seize.
This failure mode is a wear-out failure mode. The reliability analysis con-
ducted indicates that the fuel pumps exhibit a strong wear-out pattern
(beta = 3.45), as presented in section 3.10 and appendix G. Because the
failure modes are unknown, it is not possible to know the exact Weibull
shape coefficient of this failure mode but it does provide an indication that
wear-out failure modes such as this are dominant.
– Failure effect details:
∗ Failure evidence: This failure mode may result in locomotive de-rating,
but in most cases the locomotive will overload other power assemblies
and continue making full horsepower. The failure may be detected by
hearing the cylinder missing, but is most likely to be detected on a Pop
test or Dead Cylinder test.
∗ Safety and environmental consequences: Nil.
∗ Secondary Damage: The most likely case is that the pump seizes at the
top of its stroke and no further damage is caused. In the worst possible
case, the pump may seize at the bottom of its stroke and push the pump
off its mount, snapping the bolts, cracking the high pressure line and
wrecking the power assembly, requiring power assembly replacement.
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Figure 4.1: Fuel System HP Pump Seized - Decision Path
∗ Production effects: The locomotive must be shunted into the workshop
from the operational yard.
∗ Failure repair: The locomotive will need to come to the workshop for
unscheduled maintenance. It takes one fitter 3 hours to replace a failed
fuel pump (from maintenance records).
4.2.4 Failure consequences: RCM decision logic and risk assessment
The author utilised the decision path tool built into RTRS; the tool is based on the
decision diagram in figure 2.4. Figure 4.1 contains the decision logic for the failure
mode example of a seized HP pump, as discussed in section 4.2.3.
Following the structure in figure 2.4, the first question on the decision path shown in
figure 4.1 determines whether the function is hidden. The next two questions determine
if the consequences are related to safety, the environment or are operational in nature.
The following questions lead the user to evaluate the use of proactive maintenance
tasks, including condition based maintenance, restoration and replacement. If none of
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these are technically feasible or worth doing, the final questions evaluate the default
actions, which are comprised of: failure-finding tasks, run-to-failure, or redesign. This
series of questions complies with Society of Automotive Engineers (2009) and figure
2.4.
The risk assessment was carried out using the Rio Tinto risk matrix, shown in figures
4.2 and 4.3. Risk assessment is subjective by nature (Moubray 2001, pg. 101), but
the Rio Tinto risk matrix aids the analyst to be more objective by providing criteria
against which to assess the likelihood and severity of events. Note that the matrix is
in the same format as figure 2.6, which is extracted from AS60300.
The risk data was entered into the forms displayed in figures I.7 and I.8. The key points
to be noted are:
• Risk likelihood is evaluated against the service life of one locomotive, not the fleet
of locomotives. For example, if a failure is likely to occur in one locomotive in
the order of 10-20 years, then it may occur every year over the whole the fleet.
The service life of one locomotive is selected as the appropriate basis for the risk
likelihood assessment.
• Risk severity is assessed against the capital cost of replacement for the asset or
the appropriate HSE standards.
• Economic effects are counted as $50 per minute of train delay (established in
section 3.6), and each minute of train delay causes one minute delay to the train
behind it. Thus, a four hour delay caused by a locomotive failure will cause
$50/minute× 240minutes× 2 = $24, 000 revenue loss.
In the case of a seized HP pump, the unmitigated risk is evaluated as high, based on
the following assessment:
• The likelihood is assessed as likely; if no maintenance is done, it is likely that
after a period of 8 years the locomotive would experience unreliable HP pumps
and may fail one or more of the 12 pumps each year.
• The severity is assessed as moderate; the locomotive will require removal from
service, increasing the cost of failure. Secondary damage to camshafts and power
assemblies may also occur.
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Figure 4.2: Rio Tinto risk matrix, page 1
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Figure 4.3: Rio Tinto risk matrix, page 2
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4.2.5 Recommendations and mitigated risk assessment
The maintenance task recommendation and mitigated risk assessment is conducted
together, and recorded in the forms shown in figures I.9, I.10, I.11 and I.12. In the case
of the seized HP pump, a recommendation for scheduled replacement is made and the
mitigated risk is assessed as 5 (low).
The recommendation includes the following information:
Task interval. The high pressure fuel pump scheduled replacement has been tenta-
tively recommended at 17,000MWHrs (half engine life); however, there is further
work required to justify the service life as it is currently 11,000MWHrs (one third
of engine life) against the manufacturer’s recommendation of 13,000MWHrs.
Recommended resource. The type of labour, materials or services required to com-
plete the task; in this case, a the labour required is a diesel mechanic and the
materials are refurbished pumps.
Estimated costs. The cost of labour, materials and services.
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4.3 Chapter Summary
Chapter 4 has presented an overview of the process undertaken to determine engine
subsystem functions, functional failures, failure modes, failure effects, failure conse-
quences and recommended actions, or default actions, to limit risk to an acceptable
level.
Chapter 5
Reliability-Centered Maintenance
Analysis Results
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter presents a summary of the analysis results. In order to present the in-
formation, it is divided into three sections; the functional analysis, FMEA and failure
consequences and the recommended maintenance tactics, including a comparison with
the current maintenance tactics. To review the complete analysis, please refer to the
accompanying spreadsheet mayne caleb goh rcm data.xls.
5.2 Functions and Functional Failure Analysis
The identified functions, performance paramters, function type and their respective
functional failures are included in figures 5.1 and 5.2.
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Figure 5.1: RCM Functional Analysis, part 1
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Figure 5.2: RCM Functional Analysis, part 2
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Table 5.1: Summary of recommended maintenance task changes
Change Significance Count
No Change 71
Minor 11
Moderate 7
Major 0
Total: 89
5.3 Failure Modes, Failure Effects and Failure Consequences
analysis
120 failure modes have been identified through the analysis; it is not practical to present
them all in this section. As such, notable extracts have been included in figures 5.3
to 5.9. The entire list of FMEA short descriptions has been included in appendix J.
For the complete analysis, please refer to the Excel document that accompanies this
dissertation, mayne caleb goh rcm data.xls.
5.4 Recommendations Summary, Mitigated Risk Assess-
ments and Current Tactics
The complete recommendations summary and current tactics comparison is included in
appendix K. An extract of notable recommendations is included in figures 5.10 and 5.11,
which will be explored in the discussion. The recommendation changes are classified
into minor, moderate or major changes; a summary of this classification is presented
in table 5.1, which shows that the majority of tasks require no change, indicating that
the regime is generall optimised with some improvements identified.
One of the research objectives is to identify failure modes that are not addressed by a
maintenance task. Very few of these were identified; they are included in figure 5.12.
Each task type and the corresponding code is listed in table 5.2, while the risk level
classifications are provided in table 5.3. The reader can also refer to figure I.7 to view
the risk matrix.
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Table 5.2: Maintenance task classification
Code Task Classification
SCH Scheduled preventive maintenance
CBM Condition Based Maintenance
DSN Redesign opportunity
PROC Work instruction or procedure change
TRN Staff training
NSM No scheduled maintenance - run to fail
Table 5.3: Maintenance task classification
Value Range Risk Classification
0-1 Low
1-5 Medium
5-125 High
125-5000 Very High
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Figure 5.3: FMEA and Failure Consequences extract, part 1
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Figure 5.4: FMEA and Failure Consequences extract, part 2
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Figure 5.5: FMEA and Failure Consequences extract, part 3
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Figure 5.6: FMEA and Failure Consequences extract, part 4
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Figure 5.7: FMEA and Failure Consequences extract, part 5
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Figure 5.8: FMEA and Failure Consequences extract, part 6
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Figure 5.9: FMEA and Failure Consequences extract, part 7
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Figure 5.10: Notable recommendations, part 1
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Figure 5.11: Notable recommendations, part 2
Figure 5.12: Recommendations applied to failure modes that are not currently addressed
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5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented a complete summary of the functions identified by the anal-
ysis, an extract of the failure modes, failure effects and failure consequences identified
by the analysis and an extract of the maintenance recommendations generated by the
analysis, including a comparison with the current equivalent maintenance tasks.
The failure modes, failure effects, failure consequences and the recommendations that
are presented in chapter 5 will be discussed further in chapter 6.
Chapter 6
Discussion of Results
6.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a discussion on the RCM analysis preparation, process and re-
sults.
6.2 Key findings summary and discussion
6.2.1 HP fuel pump service life extension
HP fuel pumps have been identified as having exceptional performance; there have only
been ten known failures (of which three were verified to be a manufacturing defect) since
the introduction of the first 40 Evolution locomotives in 2008. The fleet size has steadily
increased to 106 in 2014, equating to 1,272 high pressure pumps currently in service.
The assessment of a life extension requires analysis of:
• Estimated failure rates
• The failure modes, effects and consequences
• Component condition inspection
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The manufacturer’s recommended service life is 13,000 MWHrs (GE Transportation
2012d, pg. 3), and the current maintenance interval is set at 11,000 MWHrs to align
with a one-third engine life replacement (which equates to approximately 2.5 years,
based on 350 MWHrs per month). The reliability modelling conducted, excluding the
known manufacturing faults, indicates that 0.43% of the population (5.5 pumps) will
fail prior to 11,000MWHrs, equating to a failure rate of 0.172% per year (2.2 pumps
per year). If the service interval is extended to 17,000MWHrs, or four years, (a 55%
increase on current life, but only a 31% increase on the OEM recommendation), 2.1%
of pumps (26.7 pumps) will fail prior to overhaul, equating to a failure rate of 0.53%
(6.7 pumps) per year.
Currently, RTIO does not have data on which failure modes will occur under an ex-
tended service life so that the failure effects and consequences can be assessed. However,
based on the FMEA analysis (figures 5.3 to 5.5), the failure modes likely to occur can
be assessed. The FMEA analysis found three failure modes that are likely to generate
secondary damage to the engine:
• Failure mode 02.01.03, the roller guide pin failure.
– This is a manufacturing defect that has been corrected.
• Failre mode 02.01.04, Roller cracking.
– This failure mode can cause secondary damage to the cam section.
• Failure mode 02.01.05, Return spring cracking.
– This will cause damage to the cam section and introduce metal debris to the
lubricating oil, although debris will be removed by the filtration system.
These failure modes are uncommon based on the current maintenance strategy, but may
become more prevalent if the service life is extended. For this reason, age exploration
is considered critical to make an informed decision regarding the optimum service life.
Age exploration of the HP fuel pump was planned to be completed during the project
but spare part availability prevented the tests from being completed. The method
would be to remove and examine pump condition at 11,000MWHrs, 13,000MWHrs,
14,000MWHrs, 15,000MWHrs, 16,00MWHrs and 17,000MWHrs.
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The analysis identified that RTIO does not currently perform a Weak Cylinder De-
tection test, which can provide a condition assessment of the pump performance at
locomotive scheduled services to support the age exploration exercise. RTIO currently
uses the Dead Cylinder Detection test (DCD) but does not perform the WCD.
The author believes that the analysis shows that further investigation is warranted to
evaluate a life extension to the HP fuel pump.
6.2.2 Injector findings
Along with HP fuel pumps, fuel injectors were identified early on in the project as
having very few in-service failures, making them a possible candidate for life extension.
However, testing revealed very poor performance of injectors at the end of their current
service life (section 3.10.2), which is very concerning and will instigate a Defect Elim-
ination (DE) project to determine the reason for the poor performance. Interestingly,
the majority of the failure modes identified for injectors were wear-out patterns, but
the reliability modelling indicated that the injector is experiencing an early-life failure
pattern. An early-life failure pattern indicates that the poor injector performance can-
not be countered by a reduced service life. At this point, no change is recommended
to the injector service life.
6.2.3 Fuel transfer pump service life extension
As noted in section 6.3.3, the individual failure modes for the fuel transfer pump (FTP)
are not known; however, modelling the entire failure dataset using RTRS showed that
as a ‘black-box’ unit, the pump displays a wear-out pattern. The dominant failure
mode is understood to be due to a design issue; the hot return fuel enters the tank next
to the fuel intake, causing the fuel transfer pump inverter to overheat (failure mode
01.07.02., figure 5.3).
A service interval optimisation was performed using RTRS (refer to figure 3.9). The
unplanned cost of replacement was estimated to be double the cost of planned replace-
ment, based on a four hour delay due to locomotive failure when the fuel pump fails.
The optimisation indicated that the best pump replacement interval is 4.5 years, which
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is slightly more than half engine life (16,875 MWHrs) as opposed to the OEM recom-
mendation of engine life (33,750 MWHrs) (GE Transportation 2012d, pg. 3) and the
current maintenance strategy of 11,000MWHrs (one third engine life).
6.2.4 Servicing Interval
Currently, locomotives are given a full service at 4 month intervals. RTIO is in the
process of managing a change to a six monthly service intervals with a three monthly
interim inspection. This initiative did not originate from the RCM analysis, but the
analysis has identified failure modes that need to be addressed at the 3 month interim
service and those that can be extended to the 6 monthly full service.
The analysis has identified that the current servicing regime, as far as the engine
subsystems that have been analysed are concerned, is over-maintaining the equipment.
For example:
• Fuel filters are rated to 6 months service (GE Transportation 2012c, pg. 6) but
RTIO replaces them at 4 month intervals (GE Transportation 2012c, pg. 6).
• Baggy air filters are currently replaced at 4 monthly intervals, but a 6-month
service life filter is available (see figure 5.7, failure mode 11.01.08).
6.2.5 Condition Monitoring using Acoustic Emissions Analysis
The literature review conducted on condition monitoring revealed Acoustic Emissions
(AE) analysis as a potential condition monitoring tool. The RCM analysis identified
that AE could address the following failure modes:
• 02.01.01. HP pump seizes.
• 02.02.01. HP fuel pump internal seals worn.
• 03.02.02. Injector nozzle blocked or partially blocked due to carbon build up.
• 03.03.01. Injector needle lift pressure low due to broken or softened spring.
• 03.03.03. Injector needle, seat, and pressure pin worn.
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• 03.03.02. Injector needle seizes due to excessive wear.
• 09.02.04. Valve disc burnt due to insufficient valve lash.
• 09.02.05. Valve fatigue fracture due to excessive valve lash.
AE would not completely eliminate any maintenance tasks, but may enable them to
become condition-based rather than scheduled, reducing the overall maintenance cost.
The maintenance tasks affected are discussed below.
Scheduled HP fuel pump replacement
The scheduled HP fuel pump replacement would become a condition-based task. The
modelling conducted (reference section 6.2.1 and figure 3.6) and the FMEA indicate
that the HP fuel pumps have a strong wear-out failure pattern. 2.1% of pumps will fail
by half engine life (17,000MWHrs, 4 years); however, if the fuel pumps are run for the
entire life, 20% of the population will fail prior to the end of engine life (33,750MWHrs,
8 years), indicating that AE has the potential to allow 80% of the fuel pumps to run
for the entire engine life. However, the author notes that the data available to support
this position is minimal, and age exploration and component inspection is required to
understand which failure modes (that are currently masked by the current maintenance
strategy) will occur.
The three pump failure modes identified as having the potential to cause secondary
damage in section 6.2.1 are not mitigated by AE. The possibility of these failure modes
occurring over the life of an engine is considered to be out of the scope of the research
project, but this work must be completed prior to implementing an AE condition
monitoring program, as it could allow serious failures to occur without any proactive
maintenance actions.
Further work required to implement an AE program includes the evaluation of the P-F
interval of each failure mode, which is considered to be out of the scope of this research
project. It has been identified that the P-F interval of each failure mode must be
greater than 6 months (the future scheduled maintenance interval) such that potential
fuel pump failures could be planned for completion at the next scheduled maintenance
interval. Constantly removing the locomotive from service outside of standard servicing
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to replace a fuel pump is a logistically costly exercise (refer to section 3.6).
Scheduled injector replacement
AE has shown the ability to detect injector malfunction, enabling injectors to be re-
placed on-condition. Injectors have a shorter life span than HP fuel pumps - an engine
will consume approximately 5 sets of injectors between overhauls - so the likelihood of
being able to reduce injector consumption is higher.
The P-F interval is critical and must be greater than 6 months, as discussed regarding
the HP fuel pumps, but the author has not been able to complete this work. The P-F
interval is particularly important because injector faults can be more sinister than high
pressure pump faults. Leaking injectors can cause piston holing, injectors that do not
atomise fuel can cause lubrication failure of the piston/cylinder interface, and both can
cause fuel dilution.
Scheduled valve lash inspection
AE can detect an incorrect valve lash, so valve lash inspection can be performed by
the AE system instead of a mechanic. This is a small saving, as valve lash inspection
accounts for approximately 2 hours of labour per locomotive per year.
Weak cylinder testing
AE can detect weak cylinders so there would be no need to run the weak cylinder
detection test, which RTIO does not currently perform.
6.2.6 Flexible hose inspection process
Flexible hose failure is a risk that has been captured in the analysis (failure modes
04.01.01 to 04.01.03). The current service procedure requires that flexible fuel hoses
should be checked for damage but does not specify which hoses should be checked or
the critical locations. A significant fuel spill has occurred due to a flexible hose rub;
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this analysis has identified that a lack of process control on the hose inspection may
leave the business exposed to risk in the future. A more robust process would be to
specify the flexible hoses and critical locations that require careful inspection.
6.2.7 Crankcase inspection
A crankcase inspection is currently performed to check for a number of failure modes
at a four-monthly interval, compared to the OEM recommended inspection interval
of twelve-monthly (GE Transportation 2012c, pg. 6). The failure modes are listed
in table 6.1, along with an estimate of the P-F interval obtained by discussion with
experienced engineers and tradespeople. The table shows that the P-F interval for
most of the failure modes is much shorter than the inspection period, meaning that the
inspection task is not ‘worth doing’ (Moubray 2001, pg. 146) (for further context, refer
to section 2.5.8). Additionally, there are alternative maintenance tasks that are ‘worth
doing’, indicating that the crankcase inspection does not contribute much to the asset
reliability.
Even though the crankcase inspection cannot be relied upon as an effective mainte-
nance task, it can still be partially effective. Not all failures will be detected, but
statistical probability dictates that a proportion of failures will be detected, depending
on the P-F interval length of the specific failure mode. The inspection also provides
the tradesperson with the advantage of internal engine component familiarity; this fa-
miliarity aids the tradesperson when troubleshooting engine faults, such as abnormal
oil analysis results or crankcase overpressure events.
Even though the crankcase inspection is not a robust maintenance task, the inspection
task still reduces the risk of failure enough to be ‘worth doing’ due to the low cost and
negligible impact on asset availability.
6.2.8 Cracked pushrods
Five locomotives have experienced a cracked pushrod (see figure 5.7, failure mode
07.01.01.). It is an uncommon failure mode and the root cause is not understood.
When modelled against the Weibull distribution (refer to figure 3.15 and 3.15), the
6.2 Key findings summary and discussion 138
Table 6.1: Failure modes addressed by the crankcase inspection
Failure Mode P-F Interval,
approximate
Alternative mainte-
nance task
Coolant leaks; 10.01.03. Cylinder liner shoulder
seal fails prematurely, 10.01.01. Cylinder liner
perforation due to cavitation corrosion
12 Months Spectrographic oil
analysis
Bearing faults; 08.02.02. Bearing failure due to
fatigue cracking, 08.02.01. Bearing seizure due
to cavitation damage
2 Weeks Spectrographic oil
analysis
Worn or distressed camshaft lobes and rollers;
02.01.04. Fuel Pump Roller Cracked, 07.01.08.
Crosshead roller cracked due to fatigue
6 months Spectrographic oil
analysis
Scored liners; 06.01.08. Piston/cylinder liner
scoring. Root cause unknown.
6 Months Spectrographic oil
analysis
Cracked liners; 06.01.01. Cylinder liner failure
due to fatigue cracking
2 Weeks Scheduled replace-
ment, Spectro-
graphic oil analysis
Piston wear and seizure; 06.01.02. Piston and
Cylinder seizure due to oil starvation, 06.01.04.
Piston skirt wear allowing misalignment and
overloading
6 Months Spectrographic oil
analysis
Signs of localised overheating; 06.01.11. Piston
component seizure due to overheating
3 Months Spectrographic oil
analysis
Loose or missing components 2 Weeks N/A
Cracked components; 08.01.02. Premature con-
necting rod fatigue failure, 06.01.03. Piston fail-
ure due to fatigue cracking
1 Week N/A
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failure pattern was found to be random. A ‘run-to-failure’ recommendation is pro-
posed for the following reasons:
• The failure pattern is random; scheduled replacement is ‘technically feasible’ but
not ‘worth doing’ because pushrods failures are not age-related.
• The project was unable to identify a ‘technically feasible’ inspection process to
support a condition-based maintenance tactic.
6.2.9 Turbo discharge O-rings
The high consumption rate of turbo discharge O-rings was identified in section 3.12.5.
The analysis process found that while these O-rings are failing regularly, they do not
cause any significant problems. As such, a run to failure recommendation has been put
forward.
6.2.10 Identification of failure modes that are not currently addressed
by a maintenance tactic
The project identified very few failure modes that are not addressed by an appropriate
maintenance strategy. They are presented in figure 5.12 and discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Fuel tank water condensation
The locomotive maintenance regime does not currently include a task to check for water
contamination by condensation (failure mode 01.08.01), nor is there an on-board water
separator. There does not appear to be a record of water condensation problem in the
maintenance history, but water ingress is considered a risk. As such, the recommenda-
tion in the analysis has been made to check the fuel tank for water condensation every
six months or to install a dehumidifying breather, water separator and alarm.
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Air-based intercooler inlet flange cracking
The air-based intercooler inlet flange is suffering cracking across 17 locomotives deliv-
ered in 2009 and 2010 (refer to figure 5.8, failure mode 11.02.07). The failure causes
boost air leakage and causes the locomotive to derate. The reliability analysis used the
Weibull distribution to determine the flanges became more unreliable with age (section
3.12.1). The author found that the OEM had upgraded the flange, so the recommen-
dation is put forward to replace the flanges on the 17 at-risk locomotives and upgrade
the flanges on the rest of the fleet at engine change.
Air-based intercooler and fans overhaul
RTIO currently has no maintenance strategy applied to the air-based intercooler; the
OEM recommends that the air-based intercooler is replaced at engine overhaul (GE
Transportation 2012d, pg. 2). The analysis found that the consequences of intercooler
failure is quite low (see figures 5.8 and 5.9), as the locomotive is likely to only derate (not
fail) and no secondary damage will be caused. However, it is likely that the intercooler
failures will be age-related due to vibration causing fatigue failure. For this reason, it
is recommended that the air-based intercoolers are subjected to ‘age exploration’ to
determine the optimum overhaul interval. Naturally, this project could not incorporate
age exploration because it will take a number of years to evaluate.
6.3 Assumptions, limitations and deviations from best
practice
6.3.1 RCM working groups
The RCM analysis process involves five or six participants, including operators, main-
tainers, engineers and technical specialists (Moubray 2001, pg. 267). Moubray (2001,
pg. 101, 286-290) advises against performing the analysis in isolation. Unfortunately,
the author was not able to engage a working group for the analysis due to resource
constraints, so the bulk of the analysis was created without a team. To mitigate this
limitation, the author consulted senior tradesmen during the development of the Fail-
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ure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) (see appendix H for the RCM introduction
presentation) and senior engineers were consulted for review of the analysis once com-
pleted.
Train drivers were not involved in the analysis which, on a surface level, contradicts
the literature (section 2.5.10). However, the author interprets the literature to refer to
operators that are responsible for directly operating the plant, thus having an intimate
knowledge of the operating behaviour and procedures of the plant. The locomotive
engine is operated indirectly; it is directly controlled by the Engine Control Unit (ECU).
Consequently, train drivers have very little knowledge of engine failure modes and are
more concerned with controlling in-train forces and obeying track speeds and signals;
therefore, they cannot participate meaningfully in an RCM/FMEA analysis.
6.3.2 Calculation of task intervals
Moubray (2001, pg. 286-290) warns that if the manufacturer’s recommendations are
relied upon, the RCM analysis effectiveness can be compromised. The author has
challenged a number of maintenance tasks and task intervals, however, the author
was unable to calculate the optimum task intervals for some recommendations. For
example, calculating the fatigue life of engine components, the P-F interval of main
bearing failure modes, or the correct interval at which to check the valve lash would
be very time-consuming, detracting from the rest of the analysis. Additionally, ‘age
exploration’ of critical components to determine the optimum interval is considered
prohibitively risky. In these instances, the OEM recommended intervals have been
accepted, and the author has taken the approach of identifying the failure modes,
failure effects and failure consequences to justify the maintenance task cost.
6.3.3 Weibull distribution modelling
The Weibull distribution should be applied to individual failure modes (Abernethy
2006, pg. 1.4)); however, the author found it necessary to apply the Weibull distribution
using poor quality data. This was performed on the HP fuel pumps, injectors and fuel
transfer pump. The HP pump failure mode data had not been systematically recorded;
in some cases, the failure mode may not be readily discernable. The fuel transfer pump
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data suffered the same problem, but in a more exaggerated manner; there was no
identification of the failure mode available because the failure mode is never diagnosed
by RTIO personnel. The decision was taken to model the components despite the
data inadequacies, with the goal of obtaining at least some indication of the dominant
failure mode pattern. The author believes this added value when assessing optimum
maintenance intervals.
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6.4 Chapter Summary
The discussion has provided the reader with further details and context surrounding
the key findings from the RCM analysis.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Further Work
This chapter presents the project conclusions, achievements and work that has been
identified for future endeavour.
7.1 Achievement of Project Objectives
The primary research aim, as detailed in the project specification (appendix A) and the
research aims and objectives (section 1.2) is to assess whether the current locomotive
engine maintenance regime is optimised and to develop and document the knowledge
of the failure modes and risk mitigated by each maintenance task.
• The project has established that the current maintenance regime applied to the
RTIO locomotive engine fuel system, power assemblies and combustion air system
is generally optimised, but a small number of opportunities to improve have been
identified. Table 5.1 shows that most maintenance tasks require no change and
no major changes are recommended. A full summary of the recommendations
and comparison to the current maintenance tactics is included in appendix K.
• The project has successfully developed a database of the RTIO Evolution loco-
motive diesel engine functions, failure modes, failure effects, failure consequences,
maintenance tactic recommendations and redesign opportunities. This database
inherently produces justification for each maintenance task according to the fail-
ure modes it addresses and clearly presents the risk that is mitigated by each
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maintenance task. Within RTIO, it is stored in a user-friendly database with
an intuitive interface; to accompany this dissertation, an exported version of the
database is provided in mayne caleb goh rcm data.xls.
The research objectives underpinning the primary research aim, as detailed in section
1.2, have been addressed and the conclusions presented below:
1. Identification of excess maintenance, inadequate maintenance and un-
documented failure modes. Areas of excess maintenance and inadequate
maintenance are identified in the recommendations results (figures 5.10 to 5.11
and appendix K) by the change level. Important recommendations are discussed
in section 6.2. The project searched for failure modes that are undocumented or
not addressed by a documented maintenance tactic and found only three items
that are not appropriately addressed by a maintenance tactic (refer to section
6.2.10). The senior technicians did not identify any ‘unofficial’ maintenance tasks.
2. Failure modes, failure effects and failure consequences analysis. The
RCM analysis has documented 120 distinct failure modes (section 5.3), evaluated
the failure effects and assessed the consequences. Information sources included
senior tradespeople, historical maintenance records and diesel engine literature
(section 4.2.3). This has provided a basis to recommend maintenance tactics that
are ‘technically feasible’ and ‘worth doing’, which are presented in chapter 5 and
discussed in chapter 6.
3. Assessment of condition monitoring technology opportunities. Heavy
diesel engine condition monitoring techniques were presented in section 2.6. Oil
analysis was found to be highly applicable and, based on the RCM analysis, it
is recommended that the current oil analysis program is continued. Acoustic
Emissions (AE) analysis is discussed further in section 6.2.5; AE is capable of
detecting a number of failure modes related to the fuel system and power assembly.
The analysis has found that an AE monitoring program is unlikely to detect all
the possible failure modes for any one component and that for the failure modes
it can detect, the P-F interval will require costly, and potentially risky, robust
evaluation. The author was not able to evaluate this data during the project.
For these reasons, AE is not recommended as RTIO is not currently ready to
make a significant commitment to an AE program. Other condition monitoring
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techniques were investigated but the analysis did not find any application for
these techniques.
4. Establish failure mode service life characteristics. Weibull analysis has
been applied to a number of components and failure modes, providing valuable
information for tactic recommendation (reference sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and
6.2.8). Some of the analyses are subject to data limitations and assumptions that
are detailed in section 6.3.3.
5. Engine system identification and prioritisation. The engine systems were
identified and prioritised in sections 3.4 and 3.5. The definition and prioritisation
process provided the necessary clarity and direction for the RCM analysis.
6. Operating context definition. The locomotive operating context has been
documented in section 3.6, providing a reference point to underpin the evaluation
of failure effects and failure consequences.
The project specification program (contained in appendix A) has been fulfilled as fol-
lows:
1. The literature on diesel engine maintenance has been reviewed and presented in
section 2.2.
2. Diesel engine condition monitoring technology has been reviewed and presented
in section 2.6.
3. The primary engine systems for power production are defined in section 3.4.
4. A criticality analysis and prioritisation of each engine system is presented in
section 3.5.
5. The author engaged working groups and individuals formally and informally to
add detail and validate the analysis, as discussed in section 6.3.1. Senior mechan-
ical technicians participated in FMEA sessions for each of the analysed engine
subsystems. The sessions were aimed at capturing undocumented failure modes
and providing an experienced assessment of failure effects. The sessions were very
informative and provided ‘front-line’ information that could not have been gained
any other way.
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6. The functional analysis has been conducted as per chapter 4, section 4.2.1 and
the results are presented in section 5.2.
7. The functional failures have been identified as per section 4.2.2 and presented in
section 5.2.
8. The failure modes, failure effects and failure consequences are identified as per
sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4; a detailed extract is presented in section 5.3, a complete
list of the short descriptions is presented in appendix J and the entire dataset is in-
cluded in the excel file accompanying this dissertation, mayne caleb goh rcm data.xls.
9. Proactive maintenance task proposals are developed as per section 4.2.5 and the
results are presented in section 5.4. The important recommended changes are
presented in figures 5.10 and 5.11 and discussed in section 6.2, providing clear
identification of items that are over-maintained and under-maintained. The com-
plete list of recommendations is included in appendix K.
10. A comparison of the proposed maintenance tasks with the current maintenance
program is presented in section 5.4.
7.2 Further Work
Fuel injector performance A defect elimination project will be required to deter-
mine the appropriate root cause of the poor fuel injector performance.
HP fuel pump life extension The project was not able to perform an age explo-
ration exercise to verify pump performance. This will need to be executed to
ensure the validity of the recommendations in this project.
Acoustic Emissions Analysis If the business decides to pursue AE analysis, a ro-
bust evaluation of the P-F interval of HP pump failures and injector failures is
required to assess whether AE can provide a positive benefit.
Further engine subsystem analysis The project has analysed engine subsystems
according to the prioritisation exercise in section 3.5; only the top 3 subsystems
have been analysed. The following systems still require analysis:
• Bottom end
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• Engine sensors
• Cooling system
• Lubricating oil system
• Exhaust air system
7.3 Project Reflection
The author’s initial understanding of how the project is valuable in both an academic
research sense and industry outcomes sense was incomplete, in that he expected the
extent of the project requirements to be the completion of some ‘unique’ work that was
grounded in a sound methodology. However, as the project ‘journey’ progressed, the
author found satisfaction in understanding how the project contributes to the body of
knowledge in academia and industry.
During the early stages of the research project, the author treated the literature review
as the precursor to developing the methodology which, in this case, is how to apply
the RCM methodology. While this is important, the author learnt that the literature
also needs to inform and aid the development of the research questions, which forms
the basis for academic research. Learning the process of using literature to identify
academic knowledge gaps and inform the research questions has given the author the
opportunity to develop the skills to complete academically robust research.
The author also learnt to differentiate between academic research and industry out-
comes. Academic research questions are driven by identifying a gap in academic lit-
erature, while industrial enterprises naturally require the application of knowledge to
improve profitability in some way. The confluence of these concepts has, in the author’s
opinion, created an interesting project that has achievements in the areas of academia,
industry and the author’s professional competencies.
The author believes that the project has achieved in two areas; firstly, the learning
outcomes discussed above and, secondly, the fulfillment of the project objectives. The
primary research aims include the assessment of the optimisation of the current main-
tenance regime applied to the locomotive engine and the development of a database
that justifies each maintenance task by documenting the failure mode and risks that are
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mitigated by each maintenance task (refer to Appendix A and section 1.2 for further
discussion on the research aims). The author is confident that the learning outcomes,
research aims and project objectives have been fulfilled.
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ENG 4111/2 Research Project
Project Specification
For: Caleb Mayne
Topic: Reliability Centred Maintenance Analysis of a
Rio Tinto Iron Ore Evolution Locomotive En-
gine
Supervisors: Steven Goh
John McArthur (Locomotive Reliability Special-
ist, Rio Tinto Iron Ore)
Sponsorship: Faculty of Health, Engineering & Sciences
Rio Tinto Iron Ore (RTIO)
Project Aim: The project aims to establish whether RTIOs current main-
tenance regime is optimised and to develop and document
the knowledge of the failure mode and risk mitigated by each
maintenance task.
Program:
1. Research maintenance and Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) related to
large diesel engines, both in rail and other industries
2. Research condition monitoring technologies applied to large diesel engines that
may be applicable to RTIO locomotives.
3. Identify the primary engine systems that are fundamental to the production of
mechanical power and;
4. Perform a criticality analysis and prioritise the engine systems for analysis
As time permits, perform steps 5-10 for each engine system:
5. The author will be required to develop the framework for the RCM analysis (items
6-10), and then engage working groups consisting of experienced tradespersons,
technicians and engineers to add detail and validate the analysis
6. Identify the functions of each system
7. The ways in which the system can fail to fulfil these functions
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8. Investigate the causes of the ‘functional failures identified (failure modes), the
failure effects and failure consequences
9. Propose maintenance tasks (predictive/preventive) to mitigate/counteract the
failures where appropriate. If required, identify items that cannot be feasibly
maintained and require redesign and propose solutions where possible
10. Compare the proposed maintenance tasks with the current maintenance program
and evaluate the magnitude of the proposed changes
11. Compile and submit an academic dissertation on the project.
Agreed:
Student Name: Caleb Mayne
Date: 12 July 2014
Supervisor Name: Steven Goh
Date:
Examiner: Chris Snook
Date:
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B.1 Engine Subsystem Prioritisation Source Data
Appendix B contains samples of the raw data used to prioritise the engine subsystems.
Figure B.1: Sample of PM02 source data
Figure B.2: Sample of PM03 source data
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Figure B.3: Sample of Network Delay source data
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Figure B.4: Sample of HSE Incident source data
Appendix C
Subsystem Boundary Definitions
C.1 Engine Subsystem Boundary Definitions
Appendix C contains the Boundary Definitions for the analysed subsystems.
C.1 Engine Subsystem Boundary Definitions 164
Figure C.1: Fuel System Boundary Overview
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Figure C.2: Fuel System Boundary Details
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Figure C.3: Power Assemblies Boundary Overview
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Figure C.4: Power Assemblies Boundary Details
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Figure C.5: Combustion Air System Boundary Overview
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Figure C.6: Combustion Air System Boundary Details
Appendix D
Bill Of Materials and assembly
drawing extract
Figures D.1 and D.2 are extracted from the GE Renewal Parts Catalogue, document
PB-16610-010 (GE Transportation 2014). Figure D.3 is extracted from the RTIO main-
tenance system.
171
Figure D.1: Renewal Parts Catalogue Part A - Partial Fuel System Bill Of Materials (GE
Transportation 2014)
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Figure D.2: Renewal Parts Catalogue Part B - Partial Fuel System Assembly Drawing (GE
Transportation 2014)
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Figure D.3: RTIO Fuel System Bill Of Materials (BOM)
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Figure D.4: Renewal Parts Catalogue Part D - Partial Power Assembly System Bill Of
Materials (GE Transportation 2014)
175
Figure D.5: RTIO Power Assembly System Bill Of Materials (BOM)
Appendix E
HSE incident report extracts
177
Figure E.1: Fuel system HSE incident - Fuel Leak - Locomotive 8150, 25 April 2012
Figure E.2: Fuel system HSE incident - Fuel Leak - Locomotive 8133, 04 March 2013
Appendix F
Component Usage Rates
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Figure F.1: Fuel Injector usage details
Figure F.2: High Pressure Fuel Pump usage details
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Figure F.3: Fuel Transfer Pump usage details
Figure F.4: Power Assembly component usage details. All usage is unscheduled.
181
Figure F.5: Combustion air system component usage details. All usage is unscheduled.
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Figure F.6: Investigation of combustion air system high-usage items
Appendix G
Reliability Modelling Supporting
Information
184
Figure G.1: High Pressure Fuel Pump reliability modelling data
Figure G.2: High Pressure Fuel Injector reliability modelling data
Appendix H
Reliability-Centered Maintenance
Overview for Participants
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Figure H.1: Slide 1
Figure H.2: Slide 2
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Figure H.3: Slide 3
Figure H.4: Slide 4
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Figure H.5: Slide 5
Figure H.6: FMEA worksheet extract
Appendix I
Rio Tinto Reliability Solution
(RTRS) Reliability-Centered
Maintenance (RCM) Screenshots
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Figure I.1: RTRS Function Definition
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Figure I.2: RTRS Functional Failure Definition
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Figure I.3: RTRS Failure Mode Definition
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Figure I.4: RTRS Failure Mode Pattern Options
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Figure I.5: RTRS Failure Effect Definition
Figure I.6: RTRS Decision Logic
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Figure I.7: RTRS Unmitigated Risk Assessment
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Figure I.8: RTRS Unmitigated Risk Assessment, page 2
197
Figure I.9: RTRS Recommendation Definition
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Figure I.10: RTRS Recommendation Definition, page 2
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Figure I.11: RTRS Mitigated Risk Assessment
200
Figure I.12: RTRS Mitigated Risk Assessment, page 2
Appendix J
Failure modes and effects analysis
short description summary
202
Figure J.1: FMEA short descriptions, part 1
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Figure J.2: FMEA short descriptions, part 2
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Figure J.3: FMEA short descriptions, part 3
Appendix K
Recommendations Summary
206
Figure K.1: Analysis recommendations, part 1
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Figure K.2: Analysis recommendations, part 2
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Figure K.3: Analysis recommendations, part 3
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Figure K.4: Analysis recommendations, part 4
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Figure K.5: Analysis recommendations, part 4
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Figure K.6: Analysis recommendations, part 4
